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I. INTRODUCTION
He knocked boldly, knowing that a soft knock is more conspicu-
ous than a loud one. He heard the echo, and nothing else. He heard
no footfall, no sudden freezing of a sound. He called "Vladimir"
through the letter-box as though he were an old friend visiting. He
tried one Yale from the bunch and it stuck, he tried another and it
turned. He stepped inside and closed the door, waiting for some-
thing to hit him on the back of the head but preferring the thought
of a broken skull to having his face shot off. He felt dizzy and real-
ised he was holding his breath. ...
The table drawer contained sheets of plain paper, a stapler, a
chewed pencil, some elastic bands, and a recent quarterly telephone
bill, unpaid, for the sum of seventy-eight pounds, which struck him
as uncharacteristically high for Vladimir's frugal life-style. He
opened the stapler and found nothing. He put the phone bill in his
pocket to study later and kept searching, knowing it was not a real
search at all, that a real search would take three men several days
before they could say with certainty they had found whatever was to
be found. If he was looking for anything in particular, then it was
probably an address book or a diary or something that did duty for
one, even if it was only a scrap of paper. He knew that sometimes
old spies, even the best of them, were a little like old lovers; as age
crept up on them, they began to cheat, out of fear that their powers
were deserting them. They pretended they had it all in the memory,
but in secret they were hanging on to their virility, in secret they
wrote things down, often in some homemade code, which, if they
only knew it, could be unbuttoned in hours or minutes by anyone
who knew the game. Names and addresses of contacts, sub-agents.
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Nothing was holy. Routines, times and places of meetings,
worknames, phone numbers, even safe combinations written out as
social-security numbers and birthdays. In his time Smiley had seen
entire networks put at risk that way because one agent no longer
dared to trust his head. He didn't believe Vladimir would have done
that, but there was always a first time.tt
Such passages routinely appear in espionage novels-the furtive look, the
quick entry, and the surreptitious search of an apartment or office where the
tools of espionage are believed to be secreted. Rarely, if ever, do the authors
relate these activities to the legal principles that are adhered to by this nation
and its government. In the fantasy world, there are no rules, and anything
goes. Reality is more complicated. The need is there, but it must be tem-
pered with proper attention to legal standards and limitations. This article is
intended to examine those principles as they apply to a particularly sensitive
type of activity-a physical search to collect foreign intelligence
information.
Executive Order 12,3331 was promulgated by President Reagan on De-
cember 4, 1981, to provide for "the effective conduct of United States intelli-
gence activities and the protection of constitutional rights."2 Section 2.5 of
that Order delegates to the Attorney General
the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the
United States or against a United States person abroad, of any
technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for
law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not
be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each
case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.3
One of the techniques encompassed by this delegation from the President is
warrantless physical searches of real and personal property to obtain foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence information as those terms are defined in
the Order.4
"t J. LECARRE, SMILEY'S PEOPLE 80, 82-83 (1979).
1. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981 Comp.), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(Supp. V 1981).
2. Id., Preamble, 3 C.F.R. at 200-01.
3. Id. § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. at 212.
4. See id. §§ 2.4(a)-(c), 3 C.F.R. at 212. Executive Order No. 12,333 defines "foreign
intelligence" to mean "information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of for-
eign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for infor-
mation on international terrorist activities." Id. § 3.4(d), 3 C.F.R. at 215. The Order defines
.counterintelligence" to mean "information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on
behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not
1985]
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Executive Order 12,333 is not the first public presidential pronouncement
of responsibilities, functions, and limitations relating to the intelligence agen-
cies of the United States government, nor is section 2.5 the first embodiment
of presidential authority or delegation to the Attorney General regarding
warrantless physical searches. In 1976 President Ford issued Executive Or-
der 11,905.' Section 5(b)(3) of that order prohibited the intelligence agen-
cies from conducting "[u]nconsented physical searches within the United
States; or unconsented physical searches directed against United States per-
sons abroad, except lawful searches under procedures approved by the At-
torney General.",
6
In 1978 President Carter issued Executive Order 12,036,7 superseding the
Ford Order' and subsequently revoked by President Reagan's Order. 9 The
Carter Order forbade warrantless physical searches either conducted in the
United States or directed against United States persons abroad "unless the
President has authorized the type of activity involved and the Attorney Gen-
eral has both approved the particular activity and determined that there is
probable cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a for-
eign power." 1°
This article describes the constitutional justification for these assertions of
Executive authority, a matter that recently has been the subject of critical
analysis" and will assume increasing significance if the Congress acts upon
its expressed interest in legislative alternatives to the status quo. 12 After
briefly describing the use of warrantless physical searches to gather foreign
including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs." Id. § 3.4(a),
3 C.F.R. at 214. The courts have not distinguished between these two types of intelligence
when discussing such operations and have used many terms to describe foreign intelligence
gathering. See generally infra text accompanying notes 59-218. Except where specified, this
article will use the term "foreign intelligence" to include "foreign intelligence" and "counter-
intelligence" as those terms are defined in Executive Order 12,333.
5. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976 Comp.), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(Supp. 1 1977).
6. Id. § 5(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 100.
7. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978 Comp.), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(Supp. III 1980).
8. Id. § 4-101, 3 C.F.R. at 132.
9. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 3.6, 3 C.F.R. 216 (1981 Comp.).
10. Exec. Order No. 12,036, §§ 2-201(b), 2-204, 3 C.F.R. 126 (1978 Comp.).
11. See Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless Na-
tional Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611 [hereinafter cited as the recent Note or Note].
12. See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, THE FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, S. REP. No. 660, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18-19 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FIVE-YEAR REPORT]; SENATE SELECT COMMIITEE
ON INTELLIGENCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
OF 1978-1981-82, S. REP. No. 691, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982).
[Vol. 35:97
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intelligence, 3 the article discusses the judicial development of a foreign in-
telligence exception to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment.1 4 It also
explains why this exception satisfies the tests the Supreme Court has devel-
oped to determine whether and when warrantless activities of this nature are
permissible.15 The parameters the Judiciary has established for the use of
this exception are also explained, 6 as are the elements relied upon by the
Judiciary and the Executive to ensure that warrantless physical searches
used to gather foreign intelligence meet the reasonableness requirements of
the fourth amendment. 7 The Executive's adherence to these requirements
also is described.' 8 Finally, the purposes and provisions of certain statutes,
including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),' 9 are
reviewed to demonstrate that Congress has not yet enacted restraints or reg-
ulations concerning this foreign intelligence collection technique.
E0
II. THE USE OF WARRANTLESS PHYSICAL SEARCHES FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
The United States intelligence structure has grown immensely in size, stat-
13. See infra text accompanying notes 21-32.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 33-163.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 164-218.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 219-90.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 291-308.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 309-26.
19. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)).
For a general discussion of FISA and its validity, see Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1116 (1980); see generally HOUSE PERMANENT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTEL-
LIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. No. 1283, pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE FISA REPORT]; SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE FISA REPORT]; FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978, CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [here-
inafter cited as FISA CONFERENCE REPORT]; see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59
(2d Cir. 1984), aff'g United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena of Martin Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 118 n.2 (2d Cir.), rev'g, 533 F. Supp.
957, 959-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re A Commission To Take Evidence
Pursuant to the Criminal Code of Canada and the United States Code and Federal Rules, in
Conjunction with a Canadian Prosecution, Styled The Queen v. Kevork, Misc. No. 15,837
(C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 5, 1985); United States v. Kozibioukian, No. CR 82-460 (CMB) (C.D.
Cal., filed June 14, 1983).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 327-412. The recent Note concludes, by compari-
son, that there is no consitutional justification for a national security exemption to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement and, alternatively, that Congress has preempted any presi-
dential prerogative that does exist by enacting FISA and through "other congressional pro-
ceedings." Note, supra note 11, at 613.
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ure, and capabilities since 1929 when Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
angrily ordered the elimination of the nation's tiny, and only, code-breaking
unit based upon the belief, expressed later, that: "Gentlemen do not read
each other's mail."'E  Subsequently, even Mr. Stimson recognized the
naivet6 of this idealistic sentiment in the modem, more dangerous world.2 2
The value of an effective intelligence capability and the cost of an inadequate
one have been illustrated time and again during our history. For example,
thousands of lives and the bulk of the Pacific fleet could have been saved if
sufficient and coherent intelligence information had been available in time to
allow our government to conclude that the Japanese diplomatic peace initia-
tive of late 1941 was an elaborate ruse, intended to lull America into compla-
cency prior to the crippling raid on Pearl Harbor.2 3
Executive Order 12,333 states: "Timely and accurate information about
the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organiza-
tions, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national security of the
United States."'24 These are not controversial or partisan principles. For
example, the Carter Executive Order on intelligence activities proclaimed
such information to be "essential to informed decision-making in the areas of
national defense and foreign relations."25 Furthermore, former Attorney
General Benjamin R. Civiletti believed: "The collection and utilization of
intelligence information are essential ingredients of foreign policy and na-
tional security, and the dramatic increase in international tensions empha-
sizes our country's crucial need for timely and accurate foreign
intelligence." 26 A companion principle, also recognized by responsible offi-
cials regardless of ideology or political affiliation, is that the essential nature
of this information does not provide a general license for its collection in a
manner that would violate the laws of the United States.27 As former Attor-
ney General William French Smith stated:
Ours is a nation of laws because we recognize the dangers when
even well-intentioned officials exercise power in secret. Even as the
preservation of our national security requires effective intelligence
gathering, the preservation of our national principles requires ac-
21. H. STIMSON & McG. BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 188 (1947).
22. See D. KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS 360 (1967).
23. See, e.g., G. PRANGE, D. GOLDSTEIN, & K. DILLON, AT DAWN WE SLEPT 326-28,
335-36, 353-69, 421 (1981).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,333, Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981 Comp.).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,036, § 2-101, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1978 Comp.).
26. Civiletti, Intelligence Gathering and the Law: Conflict or Compatibility?, 48 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 882, 883 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, Preamble, §§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200, 210-11,
212 (1981 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12,036, § 2-101, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1978 Comp.).
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countability and obedience to law in the exercise of governmental
authority-especially when secrecy is necessary.28
The executive branch has traditionally gathered foreign intelligence with-
out the sanction of warrants. Warrantless electronic surveillance has been
used by the Executive to collect intelligence information since at least the
mid-1800's when electronic communications systems first came into general
use.29 Warrantless physical searches have been used for a much longer pe-
riod of time, since surreptitious entries were an available intelligence-gather-
ing technique long before the targets and means for electronic surveillance
became available.3" These tools are not useful in all circumstances, but they
can often produce intelligence that cannot reasonably be obtained by other
means, such as physical surveillance or undercover agents.
Use of electronic surveillance and physical searches has produced major
intelligence successes. Electronic surveillance authorized under FISA, for
example, allowed the United States to break up the Walker spy ring and to
frustrate the plans of an international terrorist group, the Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia, to construct and detonate an explosive
device at an Air Canada facility in California. 3' As for physical searches,
the warrantless opening of packages entrusted to a courier by a North
Vietnamese agent in the United States for delivery to North Vietnamese rep-
resentatives in Paris revealed that a State Department employee was provid-
ing foreign agents with classified documents damaging to the United States'
position in the delicate negotiations then underway. 32
While a clandestine physical search may be a productive, easily imple-
28. Address by Attorney General William French Smith, Los Angeles World Affairs
Council, Los Angeles Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles, California (Dec. 18, 1981).
29. See Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III Rewriting the Law of Electronic
Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 (1963) (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1967)); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 33-34
(1976); Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1130, 1248-56 (1972); see also SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE To STUDY GOVERN-
MENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT:
BOOK III, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 273-351 (1976). This
Senate committee commonly was known as the "Church Committee" after its Chairman, Sen-
ator Frank Church of Idaho [hereinafter cited as CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT].
30. See CHURCH COMMITEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 355-71; CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY BICENTENNIAL PUBLICATION, INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR OF INDE-
PENDENCE 30 (1976).
31. See Wiretap Upheld in Navy Spy Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1985, at 7, col. 1; Gov-
ernment's Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Suppress, United
States v. Kozibioukian, No. CR 82-460 (CBM) (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 4, 1983).
32. See United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 60-65 (E.D. Va. 1978), agffd sub
nom. United States v. Dinh Hung Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
1985]
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mented method of obtaining valuable intelligence, it is also highly intrusive.
In addition, because of the necessary secrecy attaching to these activities,
there is always a danger that the power to authorize surreptitious entries of
real or personal property will be exercised too freely and abused. Recogniz-
ing these concerns, the executive, legislative and judicial branches each have
acted in ways appropriate to their constitutional functions to ensure that the
use of this intelligence-gathering technique is carefully controlled, and that
proper attention is devoted to pertinent constitutional, statutory, and proce-
dural limitations.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF WARRANTLESS
PHYSICAL SEARCHES
3 3
Intelligence gathering is an inherent element of the constitutional respon-
sibilities assigned to the Executive.34 The Executive's use of warrantless
physical searches to collect foreign intelligence may be critical in certain sit-
uations to fulfill presidential responsibilities to conduct the foreign affairs of
454 U.S. 1144 (1982). For a discussion of this seminal case, see infra text accompanying notes
142-63. See also infra note 413.
33. The recent Note uses the terms "intrusive surveillance" or "nonelectronic
surveillance." See, e.g., Note, supra note 11, at 611-12. Such imprecision, however, often
generates confusion between techniques regulated by the fourth amendment (physical
searches, mail opening, electronic surveillance) and other techniques such as physical
surveillance and mail "covers" that are almost never subject to the warrant requirement. See,
e.g., Note, Executive Order 12,333: Unleashing the CIA Violates the Leash Law, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 968, 978 (1985). Because the subject of this article is physical searches, that term is
used rather than the more ambiguous alternatives.
34. E.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 881 (1974); see infra text accompanying note 78. There are three possible sources for the
President's power to authorize warrantless searches or surveillance to collect national security
information: (a) inherent, extraconstitutional executive powers, i.e., powers so inextricably
linked to the office that the President need not look to the Constitution as the source of author-
ity; (b) power necessitated by powers expressly granted the President in the Constitution; and
(c) powers granted by the Congress in legislation. See Note, supra note 11, at 613. As Part V
of this article will demonstrate, (c) is not available as a source of authority for physical
searches because Congress has not granted the President such power in this area. While it
could be asserted that the Executive's authority regarding warrantless searches flows from (a),
this would run afoul of the well-accepted holding in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), that all federal power is subject to the fundamental restrictions of
the Bill of Rights. Id. at 320. See Note, supra note 11, at 614-15. Even if this approach were
available, however, there would remain the basic question of whether there is a "national se-
curity exception" to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. This article uses the term
"inherent" in a manner that brings it under (b)-a necessary attribute of constitutionally dele-
gated powers of the President. Currently, most commentators on presidential authority use
the term inherent in this context. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981);
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
YALE L.J. 467, 497 (1946); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 29, at 1257-60; infra
notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
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the nation and to safeguard its security against foreign aggression or other
hostile acts."5
It is well settled that the Chief Executive possesses certain inherent pow-
ers that derive from functions assigned to that office under the Constitution
and are not dependent upon a specific grant of authority from Congress. 6 It
also is well settled that the President's responsibility for the conduct of the
foreign relations of the United States is a primary source of these inherent
Executive powers.3 7 Similarly, the Constitution provides the President
broad, independent responsibilities to maintain and to conduct the nation's
defense that give rise to additional inherent powers.38
The structure of article II of the Constitution necessitates a doctrine of
inherent executive authority. As Chief Justice Taft stated: "The executive
power was given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where em-
phasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions
where limitation was needed . . ,3 More recently, Justice Rehnquist
wrote: "Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possi-
35. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1875); but see Note, supra note 11,
at 613-18.
36. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890-91
(1961) (presidential authority as Commander in Chief is sound basis for Navy commander's
firing of employee for failure to meet security requirements); Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (dictum) (upholding CAB denial
of an air route, the Court acknowledges the President's authority as Commander in Chief and
organ of foreign affairs); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20 (bar on arms sales abroad is lawful
based on the President's plenary power in foreign affairs and broad congressional delegations
of discretion). See generally In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (federal power to regulate inter-
state commerce includes authority to forcibly remove obstructions to freedom of such com-
merce and transport of mail); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-67 (1890) (President's responsibility
to see laws are faithfully executed serves as basis for appointing federal marshal to protect
Supreme Court Justice); supra note 34. The recent Note acknowledges that the Executive has
the authority to do what is reasonably appropriate and relevant to the exercise of powers
granted in the Constitution. Note, supra note 11, at 615-16. While the recent Note adds that
this authority is limited to appropriate means and ends in consonance with the rest of the
Constitution, it does not discuss what the rest of the Constitution requires in this regard.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (terms of agreement
recognizing Soviet government are within the President's foreign affairs power); Oetjen v. Cen-
tral Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (recognition of sovereign governments is part of the
President's foreign affairs power and forms the basis for judicial treatment of seizure of hides
by Mexican military as an act of state); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (expropriation of property by Cuban government would not be
respected as an act of state where the executive branch, with primary foreign affairs authority,
identifies no harm to United States foreign relations).
38. See, e.g., McElroy, 367 U.S. at 886; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (Executive has broad power to protect confi-
dential information, but damage from disclosure of the Pentagon Papers not sufficient to sup-
port prior restraint of publication).
39. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926).
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ble action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situa-
tion in which he might act."'
The inconsistencies that run through the cases discussing inherent Execu-
tive authority are apparent and have been subject to critical analysis.41
These inconsistencies are not surprising, however, given the relatively small
number of occasions and fragmentary factual settings within which the
courts have had the opportunity to speak on the subject of Executive author-
ity in national security matters. In addition, expansive statements of presi-
dential authority ordinarily appear in discussions of the President's power
within the foreign affairs area, while more narrow and seemingly inconsis-
tent statements usually accompany efforts to limit Executive application of
these inherent authorities to wholly domestic matters.4 2 Flaws in the rea-
soning of these cases result from the application of the relevant principle to
the facts before the courts and not from basic infirmities in the underlying
principle-the doctrine of inherent Executive powers. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly confirmed this by reciting the doctrine in the course of up-
holding various types of Executive actions, however imperfect the underly-
ing analysis may have been.
4 3
It is well settled that implementation of inherent Executive powers is sub-
ject to constitutional constraints." Similarly, Executive powers must be ex-
ercised in accordance with the statutorily expressed will of Congress when
Congress has not attempted to deprive the President of explicitly assigned
constitutional authority.4 5 Nevertheless, the existence of inherent powers
40. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (upholding President Carter's order freeing Iranian
assets from United States judicial proceedings as part of the Iranian hostages agreement).
41. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (warrantless electronic surveillance of domestic group with no ties
to a foreign power is not lawful); Note, supra note 11, at 613-18.
42. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), with
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 944
(1976); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 157-84 (1978).
43. The most recent application of the doctrine of inherent Executive authority is Dames
& Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The Court held that President Carter had the authority to
suspend claims against Iran and its nationals that were pending in American courts, despite
the absence of any explicit statutory grant of such authority. Id. at 675-88.
44. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 304, 319; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 594.
45. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (Korean War era seizure of private steel mills is a law-
making function and is not within the President's constitutional authorities); United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 611 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., concurring and dissenting), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (overhearing of defendant on warrantless foreign intelligence sur-
veillance was lawful and did not violate fourth amendment). While a few members of the
majority suggested the President might have acted in the absence of prior congressional action,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube was not fundamentally a case where the President had authority
that Congress precluded or regulated. Instead, it involved labor relations, an area traditionally
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46does not necessarily imply the existence of unlimited powers.
A. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment clearly applies to all searches by the federal gov-
ernment, including those conducted for foreign intelligence purposes.47 The
key issue, however, is whether the warrant clause of that amendment, as
distinguished from the reasonableness clause, applies to foreign intelligence
searches. The warrant clause is not applicable to all searches, and the courts
have recognized several types of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
4 8
These generally recognized exceptions include, among others, searches inci-
dent to arrest,49 "stop and frisk" searches,5° automobile searches,5" searches
assigned to Congress, where the President may not have independent power to act and the
Congress had refused to delegate such power to him. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,
568 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (D.D.C.) (Richey, J.), affid on other grounds, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc); vacated and re-
manded, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985) (mem.); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 701-02 (E.D. Pa.
1972), affld sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (mem.).
46. L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 182-83. One may argue that FISA requires a warrant for
national security-related electronic surveillance, that Congress has not explicitly authorized
the President to engage in warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes, and
that Congress could not grant such authority in disregard of the fourth amendment. Each of
these statements is true, but each is clearly beside the point. Congress did not purport to
proscribe or regulate physical searches in FISA. Accordingly, the standards set forth in that
Act have no direct consequence in adjudging the existence and extent of presidential powers in
areas other than electronic surveillance. For a discussion of Congress' intent in enacting
FISA, see infra text accompanying notes 332-65. Further, the fact that Congress has not
explicitly authorized the President to engage in warrantless searches says nothing about the
power of the President to act in the absence of congressional authorization. Similarly, whether
congressional authorization of warrantless searches would be consistent with the fourth
amendment has little to do with the issue of presidential constitutional authority in the absence
of congressional action. FISA itself suggests that Congress may authorize certain types of
warrantless searches if sufficiently stringent substantive and procedural protections attend such
action. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
47. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602-03 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). For a discussion of this important case, see infra
notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
48. The recent Note suggests that the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amend-
ment to bar warrantless searches, even if reasonable. Note, supra note 11, at 618-19 & n.42.
Nevertheless the Note acknowledges that such searches may be permissible in exigent circum-
stances. Id. at 618, 620 & n.46. As we shall show, however, the judicially developed excep-
tions to the warrant clause have not been limited to exigencies. See infra notes 49-57 and
accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
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of people and objects entering5 2 and leaving53 the country, searches of boats
on navigable waters, 4 searches of closed containers in automobiles that have
been lawfully stopped," searches of airplanes,56 and searches of the scene of
a fire to avoid its spread or reignition." All of these exceptions are pre-
mised, in one way or another, on the circumstances surrounding the particu-
lar type of search.
The issue then becomes not whether the fourth amendment requires a
warrant for all searches, but whether there is a valid and recognized excep-
tion to the warrant clause for reasonable foreign intelligence searches. The
executive branch has consistently taken the position that foreign intelligence
searches do indeed constitute another exception to the warrant requirement.
The courts as well consistently have upheld this position and have recog-
nized such an exception in the context of electronic surveillance. This article
will first discuss the cases on electronic surveillance and then demonstrate
that there is no reasonable basis for excluding physical searches, as distin-
guished from electronic surveillance, from the scope of this exception.5"
1. The Judicial Development of the Exception for Foreign Intelligence
Gathering
Judicial development of an exception to the warrant clause for foreign
intelligence gathering occurred primarily during the 1970's as the courts as-
sessed the growing use of electronic surveillance. The exception did not
emerge fully developed. Instead, aspects of the doctrine were added incre-
mentally as the Judiciary achieved a better understanding of the legitimate
291 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
300 (1967).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
51. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 838 (1982);
United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving
Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172 (1983).
52. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973).
53. United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977-79 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1982); see California
Bankers' Ass'n v. Schultz, 516 U.S. 21, 63 (1974) (dictum).
54. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S., 579 (1983).
55. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 838; Katz, supra note 51, at 172.
56. United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 104-06 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States
v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1983).
57. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287
(1984). For a discussion of Clifford, the most recent Supreme Court exposition on the inter-
play and differentiation between the warrant clause and the reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment, see infra notes 262-72 and accompanying text.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 164-218.
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need to gather foreign intelligence and the potential impact of increasingly
sophisticated surveillance technology on the public's privacy interests. A
detailed examination of the cases that explained and developed the exception
demonstrates that the Judiciary, by acknowledging the validity of warrant-
less foreign intelligence gathering in fairly precise circumstances, has created
a reasonable balance between these unavoidably conflicting imperatives.
While the Supreme Court has never directly considered an exception to
the warrant clause for foreign intelligence gathering, several lower courts
have addressed this issue. The first appellate decision on this point was
United States v. Clay,5 9 which involved the prosecution of Muhammad Ali,
then known as Cassius Clay, on charges of refusing to submit to the selective
service. During Ali's first appeal of his conviction, the government revealed
that five telephone conversations involving Ali had been "overheard" on
FBI wiretaps targeted against persons other than Ali. The Supreme Court
vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a determination of
whether the conviction had been influenced by the wiretapping.' The dis-
trict court conducted an in camera review of the FBI's surveillance logs and
ordered disclosure to Ali of the records relating to four of the intercepted
conversations. The court did not require disclosure of the fifth conversation,
however, holding it to be the product of "a lawful surveillance by the FBI
pursuant to the Attorney General's authorization of a wiretap for the pur-
pose of gathering foreign intelligence."'"
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit up-
held the district court's treatment of the surveillance, including the basis for
its refusal to disclose a portion of the materials.6 2 The court of appeals be-
lieved that neither the Constitution nor any statute forbade warrantless intel-
ligence gathering, and concluded: "No one would seriously doubt in this
time of serious international insecurity and peril that there is an imperative
necessity for obtaining foreign intelligence information ....
59. 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
60. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969) (per curiam), vacating and remanding
United States v. Clay, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968).
61. Clay, 430 F.2d at 166.
62. Id. at 168-72.
63. Id. at 172. The court specifically ruled that warrantless electronic surveillance was
not prohibited by § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982). Id. This
act provides criminal penalties for divulging the contents of a wire or radio communication.
The executive branch has interpreted "divulgence" in a manner that does not preclude use of
such information solely within the government. For a discussion of the Act and this interpre-
tation, see Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 10-13; THE CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
29, at 278-79. See generally Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Butenko, 494 F.2d
at 598-602.
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Clay ultimately was reversed on other grounds by the Supreme Court.6 4
Nevertheless, Clay's conclusions regarding the permissibility of warrantless
electronic surveillance subsequently were reaffirmed by the Fifth Circuit as
part of the prosecution of H. Rap Brown on firearms charges in United
States v. Brown. 65 The district court had conducted an in camera inspection
of three documents describing conversations that, like those in Clay, in-
volved the defendant but were obtained in the course of electronic surveil-
lance of other persons. The court's review led it to conclude that the
intercepted conversations had no bearing on the government's case and had
not tainted the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction. In addition,
the court concluded that the surveillances in question, which were warrant-
less and had been conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information, were lawful.66
The Fifth Circuit affirmed this holding in an opinion written by Judge
Griffin B. Bell-later to serve as Attorney General in the Carter administra-
tion.67 The court concluded that warrantless electronic surveillance used to
gather foreign intelligence information was a valid exercise of the President's
inherent constitutional powers.68 In a concurring opinion, Judge Irving
Goldberg agreed that this surveillance was "legitimate" and not a "spurious
use of national security as a cover" for improper warrantless surveillance.69
64. Clay, 403 U.S. at 698 (failure to identify reason for denial of conscientious objector
status).
65. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1973).
66. United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531, 535-37 (E.D. La. 1970).
67. Brown, 484 F.2d at 426-27.
68. The opinion concisely stated its conclusion in this regard:
[B]ecause of the President's constitutional duty to act for the United States in the
field of foreign relations, and his inherent power to protect national security in the
context of foreign affairs, we reaffirm what we held in [Clay], that the President may
constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence. Restrictions upon the President's power which are appropriate in cases
of domestic security become artificial in the context of the international sphere.
Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 427. Judge Goldberg emphatically stated:
There can be no quibble or quarrel with the findings and conclusions that the wiretap
under consideration here had its origin and complete implementation in the field of
foreign intelligence. This Court and the able district judge have conducted inescap-
ably independent reviews of the action of the then Attorney General in authorizing
this warrantless electronic surveillance. All agree in the determination that the wire-
tap was indeed directly related to legitimate foreign intelligence gathering activities
for national security purposes; and that it was, therefore, a legal wiretap and not
within the ambit of Alderman v. United States. This case in no way involved the
spurious use of national security as a cover for warrantless electronic surveillance of
accused and potential criminal defendants, domestic radicals, or political dissenters;
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In United States v. Butenko,7 ° the government successfully prosecuted
John Butenko, an American citizen, and Igor Ivanov, a Soviet national, for
conspiracy to transmit information relating to the national defense of the
United States to the Soviet Union, i.e., espionage. While the defendants'
post-conviction appeals were pending, the government revealed that the de-
fendants had been overheard in the course of electronic surveillance con-
ducted by the government. The United States Supreme Court vacated the
convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether
the protections afforded to the defendants by the fourth amendment had
been violated and whether the convictions had been tainted by any such
violations.71
On remand, the district court conducted an in camera review of materials
relating to the surveillance. It concluded that part of the surveillance,
although warrantless, was conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence information and represented a lawful exercise of the President's
inherent powers to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in
Chief.72 At the same time, the government conceded that part of the surveil-
lance of Ivanov had been unlawful.73 Nevertheless, the district court con-
cluded that these activities had not tainted Ivanov's conviction.74
Subsequently, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that the illegal surveillance had not
tainted the conviction. However, it concluded that the foreign intelligence
surveillance had violated section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
and, therefore, was illegal.75 The government petition for an en banc hear-
ing of the panel decision was granted and, subsequently, the full court af-
firmed all the findings of the district court.7 6
and the panel opinion narrowly barricades warrantless wiretaps within the confines
of legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance.
Id. (citations omitted). For further discussion of Judge Goldberg's concurrence, see infra
notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
70. 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967), vacated and remanded sub nom. Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); on remand, United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J.
1970), United States v. Ivanov, 342 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J. 1972), aff'd, United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
71. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 186.
72. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. at 71-74.
73. Ivanov, 342 F. Supp. at 930. The reasons for the government's concession are not set
forth, but it may be that the surveillances had not been expressly authorized by the President
or the Attorney General. See id. at 931 n.3; see generally infra text accompanying notes 219-
47.
74. Ivanov, 342 F. Supp. at 936-42.
75. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 597.
76. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593. The full court rejected the panel's holding on § 605 of the
Communications Act. Id. at 598-602.
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The court's final decision recognized the significance of the issues before
it:
The disposition of this appeal, which requires us to consider the
relationship between the federal government's need to accumulate
information concerning activities within the United States of for-
eign powers and the people's right of privacy as embodied in stat-
ute and the Fourth Amendment, represents, in effect, part of the
federal judiciary's attempt to strike a proper balance between these
two compelling, albeit not easily reconciled, interests.77
In its discussion, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the Constitution did
not expressly authorize the President to conduct foreign intelligence activi-
ties, but it concluded that such authority could be "implied from his duty to
conduct the nation's foreign affairs." 7 While the court did not indicate that
the fourth amendment was inapplicable to such surveillance, it did question
"the necessity for prior judicial authorization" of such surveillance.79
In analyzing the warrant requirement, the court recognized that certain
"salutary effects" follow from requiring prior judicial approval of electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.8 0 It also recognized, however,
that the continuous flow of information necessary to "the efficient operation
of the Executive's foreign policy-making apparatus" was the type of "strong
public interest" that had prompted courts to dispense with the warrant re-
quirement in other contexts.8 '
77. Id. at 596.
78. Id. at 603.
79. Id. (emphasis in the original). The recent Note favorably cites Judge Gibbons' dis-
senting conclusion that a warrant should be required except where there are exigent circum-
stnaces or where courts may not lawfully issue a warrant. Note, supra note 11, at 625 n.87.
Neither Judge Gibbons nor the recent Note, however, explain where the courts would draw
the authority to grant warrants for searches to gather foreign intelligence rather than evidence
of a crime. Surely the Judiciary, as well as Congress and the Executive, is constrained by the
absence of authority for a proposed action. Similarly, these texts fail to address the exigency
presented by the fact that, in the absence of the means to acquire such a warrant, the sole
alternative to Executive action may be the irretrievable loss of essential foreign intelligence
information and consequent harm to the national security. See infra notes 185-200 and accom-
panying text.
80. Id. at 605.
81. The Court stressed:
It would be unfortunate indeed if. . .the President must act illegally to perform
his constitutional duties. Yet, if the President must act secretly and quickly to inves-
tigate an attempt by a foreign agent to obtain important intelligence information,
such a result may follow under Judge Gibbons' analysis [in dissent]. Also, foreign
intelligence gathering is a clandestine and highly unstructured activity, and the need
for electronic surveillance often cannot be anticipated in advance. Certainly occa-
sions arise when officers, acting under the President's authority, are seeking foreign
intelligence information, where exigent circumstances would excuse a warrant. To
demand that such officers be so sensitive to the nuances of complex situations that
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In United States v. Buck, 82 the district court had ruled that the contents of
a government wiretap did not have to be disclosed to the defendant, charged
with firearms violations, "because it was expressly authorized by the Attor-
ney General and lawful for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence."83
Relying on Butenko and Clay, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit agreed that: "Foreign security wiretaps are a recognized ex-
ception to the general warrant requirement .... ""
In addition to these appellate court decisions, five district court opinions
have addressed the Executive's authority to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. In United States v. Hoffman, 5
Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr., who later became Chief Judge of the United
States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court established by FISA,16 held
that the government lawfully intercepted the defendant's conversations dur-
ing a warrantless electronic surveillance "conducted for the purpose of gain-
ing foreign intelligence information."87 Further, in United States v. Stone88
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that war-
rantless surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes and ap-
they must interrupt their activities and rush to the nearest available magistrate to
seek a warrant would seriously fetter the Executive in the performance of his foreign
affairs duties.
In sum, we hold that, in the circumstances of this case, prior judicial authorization
was not required since the district court found that the surveillances of Ivanov were
"conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information."
Id. (footnotes omitted); but see id. at 608-15 (Seitz, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 626-
41 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part). The recent Note questions the validity of this holding
because of the author's opinion that the court did not explain sufficiently how a warrant re-
quirement would interfere with the flow of foreign intelligence information. Note, supra note
11, at 624 n.83. If the fourth amendment is applicable, runs the argument, there is no consitu-
tionally recognized government interest in unreasonable searches and, therefore, nothing is lost
by requiring a warrant. This stands logic on its head since the issue is whether the fourth
amendment warrant requirement applies at all. One of the essential elements in making that
determination is whether the governmental purpose would be frustrated, i.e., whether some-
thing would be lost by requiring a prior judicial warrant. See infra text accompanying notes
181-218.
82. 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
83. Id. at 875.
84. Id.
85. 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971).
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1982); see infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
87. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. at 508. In addition to the five opinions discussed here, a sixth
district court held, in an opinion subsequently reversed on other grounds, that "a warrant is
not required for foreign intelligence electronic surveillances authorized by the President where
the target of the surveillance is an agent of or acting in collaboration with a foreign power."
Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 576 (E.D. Mich. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d
272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
88. 305 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1969).
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proved by the Attorney General did not violate section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.89 The Stone court also found that the surveil-
lance had occurred prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Katz v. United
States9° and had been conducted in a manner consistent with the pre-Katz
interpretation of the fourth amendment. 9 ' The United States District Court
for the Central District of California in United States v. Smith9 2 offered the
opinion, albeit in dictum, that although warrantless electronic surveillance
was unconstitutional "in the domestic situation," it would be constitutional
"in the area of foreign affairs" because of "the President's long-recognized,
inherent power with respect to foreign relations."93
In addition, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York in both United States v. Falvey94 and United States v. Megahey9"
considered the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause in con-
junction with their holdings that FISA is constitutional. The district court
in Falvey concluded that when the primary purpose of the surveillance is the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information, the President's "exercise of
Article II power to conduct foreign affairs is not constitutionally hamstrung
by the need to obtain prior judicial approval before engaging in wiretap-
ping," but the "search and seizure resulting from the surveillance must still
be reasonable." 96 The district court in Megahey discussed the earlier cases
that recognized the President's authority in this area97 and concluded: "In
light of this precedent, it is evident that there is a strong case for the recogni-
tion of a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement under the
fourth amendment., 98
The Supreme Court has never spoken directly to the subject of warrantless
electronic surveillance or physical searches to gather foreign intelligence in-
formation. Nevertheless, Justice Byron White's brief concurrence in Katz9 9
expressed the view that warrantless electronic surveillance for "national se-
89. Id. at 80-82.
90. Katz v. United States, which held for the first time that electronic surveillance is a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For fur-
ther discussion of Katz, see infra notes 99-103, 220-21, 280-86, and accompanying text.
91. Stone, 305 F. Supp. at 79-80.
92. 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
93. Id. at 426.
94. 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (McLaughlin, J.).
95. 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Sifton, J.), afrd sub nom. United States v. Dug-
gan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
96. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1311-12 (footnote omitted).
97. See Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1186-88.
98. Id. at 1188.
99. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring). For further discussion of Justice
White's statements in Katz, see infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
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curity" purposes would be reasonable under the fourth amendment if the
President or the Attorney General had authorized the surveillance for that
purpose.'0° Justice William 0. Douglas, in a concurrence joined by Justice
William P. Brennan, strenuously objected."01 Justice Douglas viewed Jus-
tice White's statements "as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Execu-
tive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases
which the Executive Branch itself labels 'national security' matters."'' 02
Subsequently, as part of the remand of the Clay case discussed earlier,10 3
Justice Potter Stewart acknowledged this dispute among these three Jus-
tices"° and commented that "the issue remains open."' '  Justice Stewart
also noted that the Solicitor General had, "mystifyingly, sought to concede
that the surveillances in [Butenko and Ivanov] were in fact unconstitutional,
although he was repeatedly invited to argue that they were not.' 0 6 He then
noted that "the Court declined to accept the Solicitor General's proffered
concession."107
Other Supreme Court decisions are helpful in an indirect sense to under-
stand the context of the foreign intelligence exception. The government in-
dictment in 1969 of several individuals for destruction of government
property eventually led the Court to define more clearly the outer perimeter
of this exception to the warrant requirement. One defendant's telephone
conversations had been overheard on wiretaps of other defendants that had
been instituted without a warrant and approved by Attorney General John
N. Mitchell on national security grounds. Judge Damon J. Keith of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that
the surveillances were illegal and ordered the surveillance materials dis-
closed to the defense.'0 8 The government sought a writ of mandamus, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge
Keith's holdings.'0 9
The government again appealed and, in what has come to be known as the
Keith decision, "0 the Supreme Court considered "the delicate question of
100. Katz, 389 U.S. at 364.
101. Id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring). For further discussion of this opinion, see
infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
102. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.'
103. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
104. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313-15 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 315.
106. Id. at 313-14 n.1 (emphasis in the original).
107. Id. at 314 n.l.
108. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
109. United States v. United States District Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
110. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Keith].
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the President's power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize
electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial ap-
proval." 1" The Court noted that resolution of the question required "sensi-
tivity both to the government's right to protect itself from unlawful
subversion and attack and to the citizen's right to be secure in his privacy
against unreasonable Government intrusion."' 1 2 The Court posited the fol-
lowing two-part test to determine which interest would be paramount:
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic secur-
ity requires the use of electronic surveillance, the question is
whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression may
not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveil-
lance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant require-
ment would unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to protect
itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed against it. 11
Applying this test to domestic security investigations, the Court concluded
that in this context "an appropriate prior warrant" must be obtained to au-
thorize governmental electronic surveillance.' 14
Keith acknowledged that many factors differentiate domestic security sur-
veillances from those of "ordinary crime.""' Significantly, the Court also
noted that its decision was limited to domestic security situations and did
not reach surveillances for foreign intelligence purposes." 6
111. Id. at 299.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 315.
114. Id. at 320. The recent Note seizes upon the failure of Keith to provide definitions or
guidelines as to what constitutes "domestic" or "international" organizations and observes, in
contradiction of the Keith holding itself, that such a distinction may be constitutionally irrele-
vant. Note, supra note 11, at 623. Congress apparently did not agree with this assertion when
it provided different approval standards in FISA depending upon whether the surveillance is
directed against domestic groups or against foreign powers. Compare 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a),
1801(b)(l) (1982) with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (1982); see Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1198-1200.
The recent Note also points to the absence of a definition for the term "agent of a foreign
power" in Executive Order No. 12,333 as evidence of a "problem" in drawing these distinc-
tions. Note, supra note 11, at 623 n.73. The fact that FISA includes detailed definitions of this
and other relevant terms in 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982), demonstrates that the Executive, Con-
gress, and the Judiciary are able to develop meaningful distinctions in this area as necessary.
See infra notes 319-21.
115. 407 U.S. at 322; see infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
116. 407 U.S. at 308-09, 321-22; see also Giordano, 394 U.S. at 313-15 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23; id. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring). The recent Note claims
that both the Supreme Court in Katz and Congress, in enacting title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act one year later, expressly reserved their positions on the question
of warrantless national security surveillances. Note, supra note 11, at 622. This is a two-edged
proposition, however, since it indicates that both the Court and Congress clearly were aware of
these Executive activities and either declined to comment or acquiesced in the status quo.
The recent Note also speculates, without further explanation, that the Supreme Court's res-
[Vol. 35:97
Warrantless Physical Searches
The most extensive and critical judicial analysis of the Executive's use of
warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is con-
tained in Zweibon v. Mitchell. 11 In that case, members of the Jewish De-
fense League (JDL) sought damages for warrantless electronic surveillance
by the government of their telephone conversations. The plaintiffs had no
connection to any foreign power, but the JDL had been involved in demon-
strations and violence directed at the diplomatic establishments of the Soviet
Union and several Arab countries."' 8 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that the activities of the JDL were a
clear threat to this country's foreign relations."1 9 Accordingly, because the
court found the warrantless surveillances both reasonable and within the
scope of the Executive's inherent power to conduct foreign relations, it con-
cluded the surveillances were lawful under the fourth amendment.1 20
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit systematically examined the validity of all warrantless electronic
surveillance." 1 The plurality opinion in Zweibon extensively discussed the
question of warrantless surveillances and, rejecting the holdings of Butenko,
Brown, and Clay, suggested in dictum that there should be no exception to
the warrant requirement, even for presidentially authorized foreign intelli-
gence surveillances. 122 The court was sharply divided, however, and a ma-
jority agreed only to hold, consistent with the Supreme Court's finding in
Keith, that "a warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed on a
domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor acting in collaboration
with a foreign power," even if the surveillance was conducted "under presi-
dential directive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection
ervation of this issue in Katz "might imply" that any national security exception is limited to
electronic surveillance to the exclusion of physical searches. Note, supra note 11, at 629. It
also claims as more probable, however, that the "national intelligence network has tradition-
ally relied much more heavily on electronic surveillance than on other types of searches." Id.
(citing J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET
AGENCY (1982)). No empirical or logical basis is presented for this statement, and it seems
more appropriate to conclude that the Court did not refer to searches for the same reason it
did not provide a holding on the national security exception-the issue was not present in the
case. In any event, the Note does recognize that no principled distinction can be drawn, in
fourth amendment terms, between electronic surveillance and physical searches. Note, supra
note 11, at 629; see infra text accompanying notes 164-80.
117. 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
118. Zweibon, 363 F. Supp. at 938-42, rev'd, 516 F.2d at 608-11.
119. Zweibon, 363 F. Supp. at 943-44.
120. Id. at 944.
121. Zwiebon, 516 F.2d at 611-73.
122. Id. at 651.
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of the national security."' 123
In United States v. Ajlouny, 124 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York also considered the exception to the warrant
clause for foreign intelligence gathering. A jury had found Ajlouny guilty of
transporting stolen property in foreign commerce. 125 Prior to trial the gov-
ernment had informed the court that some of Ajlouny's telephone conversa-
tions had been "overheard by the FBI 'during the course of foreign
intelligence national security electronic surveillances.' ,126 The trial court
reviewed the surveillance records in camera and found that they had no
bearing on the charges facing Ajlouny. The court also found the surveil-
lance lawful because the Attorney General had approved it "to monitor
what the court finds were persons, agencies and matters involving foreign
intelligence of legitimate concern to the national security." 127
On appeal, Ajlouny contended that the wiretapping violated his fourth
amendment rights.12 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that it did not have to decide whether warrantless foreign
intelligence surveillance was lawful. It reasoned that the defendant would
argue for exclusion of the evidence if the surveillance was unlawful, but the
court did not believe the exclusionary rule should be applied in this case.129
The Second Circuit explained that the Supreme Court had determined "that
where 'law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that their
conduct was in accordance with the law,' the imperative of judicial integrity
is not offended by permitting unlawfully obtained evidence to be introduced
at trial." 1
30
The court then analyzed the surveillance of Ajlouny. It noted that no
federal statute or Second Circuit decision required a warrant for foreign in-
telligence surveillance and that the "preponderant" view of other circuits
was that warrantless surveillance of this type was proper. "In short, this is
123. Id. at 614. The recent Note cites Zweibon as evidence that the lower courts are di-
vided on the question of whether there is a national security exception to the warrant require-
ment. Note, supra note 11, at 620 n.49. It later acknowledges, however, that even the Zweibon
plurality opinion did not rule out warrantless surveillance of foreign powers, their agents, or
collaborators. Id. at 625-26.
124. 476 F. Supp. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
125. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 832-33; see 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
126. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 838; Ajlouny, 476 F. Supp. at 999 n.2.
127. Ajlouny, 476 F. Supp. at 999 n.2 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
128. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 837.
129. Id. at 839-40.
130. Id. at 840 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 n.23 (1976); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1975); United States v. Reda, 563 F.2d 510, 511-12 (2d Cir.
1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978)).
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not a case where the government agents who initiated the surveillance of the
defendant could be charged with knowledge that their conduct was
improper." 1
31
The Second Circuit then concluded that the requirements of FISA, which
had been enacted after the surveillances in question, substantially reduced
the importance of deciding whether the Constitution independently requires
a warrant for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. Consequently, the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality of warrantless foreign intelli-
gence surveillance.
132
The enactment of FISA has diminished the practical significance of these
decisions permitting the Executive to conduct warrantless electronic surveil-
lance to gather foreign intelligence in the United States. Despite FISA, how-
ever, these cases, when taken together, provide a rational and cohesive
analysis of the legal principles underlying the exception to the warrant
clause for foreign intelligence gathering and the parameters of that excep-
tion. Before addressing these principles, 31 it is important to discuss the two
cases that applied this analysis to physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes.
2. The Barker/Martinez and Truong/Humphrey Investigations
The exception to the warrant clause for foreign intelligence gathering has
been applied to physical searches in two cases. In the first, a badly divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the convictions of Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez, who were con-
victed of conspiracy to violate the civil rights of Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-
trist by breaking into his office.' 34 Barker and Martinez argued that their
convictions should be reversed because they believed that their actions were
properly authorized and, therefore, lawful. Two judges on the panel voted
to reverse the convictions, but they were unable to agree on the reasoning for
reversal. One judge, Malcolm R. Wilkey, argued, in part, that because war-
rantless foreign intelligence-gathering activities were reasonable under some
circumstances, Barker and Martinez could have reasonably believed the
statements of E. Howard Hunt that the search was lawful."' Judge Wilkey
emphasized that the Justice Department had long acknowledged that it
could identify no "constitutional difference" between wiretapping and
131. Aflouny, 629 F.2d at 841.
132. Id. at 842.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 219-308.
134. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For discussion of this case,
see infra notes 225-38, 248-51, and accompanying text. See also infra note 413.
135. Barker, 546 F.2d at 949-54.
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"physical entries into private premises," and that warrantless physical
searches were permissible "under the proper circumstances when related to
foreign espionage or intelligence."'
136
District Judge Robert R. Merhige, sitting by designation, also voted to
reverse but on different grounds. 137 Judge Merhige declined to concur in the
Attorney General's position that there was a "national security" exception
permitting warrantless intrusions into a citizen's home or office because that
issue was not before the court. 1 38  Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal dis-
sented, in part because Barker and Martinez had not asserted a belief that
either the President or the Attorney General had personally authorized the
search. " Such approval is widely recognized as one of the essential prereq-
uisites for a lawful warrantless physical search to collect foreign
intelligence. 141
By far the most significant judicial statement regarding warrantless physi-
cal searches for foreign intelligence purposes arose out of the national secur-
ity investigation that resulted in the conviction of Ronald Humphrey and
Truong Dinh Hung in United States v. Humphrey. 142 Truong was a
Vietnamese citizen living in the United States.' 43 In 1976 he persuaded an-
other Vietnamese-American to carry packages of documents to representa-
tives of the North Vietnamese government who were in Paris negotiating
with American representatives.44 Unbeknownst to Truong, his courier was
also a CIA and FBI informant. 4 ' President Carter and Attorney General
Bell authorized warrantless physical searches of the sealed packages and en-
velopes Truong had entrusted to the courier.' 46 The three searches con-
ducted under that authority revealed that the packages taken to Paris
contained diplomatic cables and other classified United States government
136. Id. at 950 (quoting Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 2 (footnote
and citation omitted)); see infra note 171 and accompanying text. Barker and Martinez made
similar arguments when they sought to withdraw their pleas of guilty to the Watergate break-
in. See Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975). A
majority of the court affirmed the district court's refusal to permit withdrawal of the pleas, but
Judge Wilkey dissented, raising arguments similar to those discussed here. See Barker, 514
F.2d at 268-70.
137. Barker, 546 F.2d at 954-57.
138. Id. at 957 n.6.
139. Id. at 957-73.
140. Id. at 961-63.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 219-90.
142. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978), afl'd sub nom. United
States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
143. Truong, 629 F.2d at 911.
144. Id. at 911-12.
145. Id. at 912.
146. Id. at 917 n.8; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 62-63.
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papers. 147 The government began an extensive investigation to determine
the source of the documents, and Attorney General Bell authorized a wire-
tap of Truong's telephone and microphone surveillance of his apartment. 14 8
The investigation eventually focused on Humphrey, an employee of the
United States Information Agency, and President Carter authorized the
clandestine installation of closed-circuit television equipment in Humphrey's
government office. 149 Truong and Humphrey were eventually tried for
espionage. "o
Truong and Humphrey moved to suppress the evidence the government
had obtained through warrantless means, but the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that when the govern-
ment began electronic surveillance of the defendants it did so "for the pri-
mary, or even sole, purpose of foreign intelligence gathering.""'' On this
basis, the court adopted the reasoning of Brown and Butenko and concluded
that there is an exception to the warrant requirement for properly approved
surveillances conducted for the primary purpose of gathering foreign intelli-
gence information.'5 2 Applying this test, the court ruled that most of the
electronic surveillance was lawful but that a portion of the surveillance
should be suppressed because it had been conducted after the focus of the
investigation had shifted from intelligence gathering to criminal
prosecution. 153
The court also relied upon the foreign intelligence-gathering exception to
the warrant requirement in assessing the validity of the warrantless physical
searches that had been authorized by President Carter. 54 Although two of
147. Truong, 629 F.2d at 911-12.
148. Truong, 629 F.2d at 912.
149. Id. at 917 n.7; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 59. The complex issues raised by electronic
visual surveillance are beyond the scope of this article. See generally United States v. Torres,
583 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ill. 1984), reversed and remanded, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984); In re
An Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communi-
cations and Videotape Surveillance, 513 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1980) (Keeton, J.); People v.
Teichner, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 422 N.E.2d 506 (1981), affig 90 Misc. 2d 638, 395 N.Y.S.2d 587
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Right of Privacy: When Is Elec-
tronic Observation Reasonable?, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1978); Note, Electronic Sur-
veillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
261 (1976). In any event, the enactment of FISA, which authorizes and requires judicial ap-
proval for the use of electronic visual surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, moots the
question of whether a warrant should be required for electronic visual surveillance in the
United States to gather foreign intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0(4) (1982).
150. Truong, 629 F.2d at 911.
151. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 58.
152. Id. at 55-59; see also infra note 413.
153. Id. at 58-59.
154. Id. at 62-63.
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the searches were deemed valid, the fruits of the third physical search were
suppressed on the same ground that had been applied to suppress a portion
of the warrantless electronic surveillance."' Because the primary purpose
of the investigation had shifted from foreign intelligence collection to gather-
ing criminal evidence, the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant re-
quirement could not be applied to legitimate the third warrantless search.' 5 6
Thus, the admissibility of the fruits of these warrantless searches was deter-
mined by applying the same analytical framework that had been applied to
determine the admissibility of information acquired through the warrantless
electronic surveillance.' 57
Both Truong and Humphrey subsequently were convicted of espionage in
a jury trial. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court "that the Executive Branch need not
always obtain a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance," at least where
the Executive's primary purpose is to gather foreign intelligence. '5 8 The cir-
cuit court's explanation of the basis for this conclusion was particularly co-
gent, and elaborated on the differences between the Executive and the
Judiciary that militate against requiring a prior judicial warrant.' 59 Based
155. Id. at 63; see infra text accompanying notes 253-75.
156. 456 F. Supp. at 63.
157. Id. at 59.
158. Truong, 629 F.2d at 913-15.
159. The court explained:
For several reasons, the needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of
foreign intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant re-
quirement would, following Keith, "unduly frustrate" the President in carrying out
his foreign affairs responsibilities. First of all, attempts to counter foreign threats to
the national security require the utmost stealth, speed, and secrecy. A warrant re-
quirement would add a procedural hurdle that would reduce the flexibility of execu-
tive foreign intelligence initiatives, in some cases delay executive response to foreign
intelligence threats, and increase the chance of leaks regarding sensitive operations.
More importantly, the executive possesses unparalleled expertise to make the deci-
sion whether to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance, whereas the judiciary is
largely inexperienced in making the delicate and complex decisions that lie behind
foreign intelligence surveillance. The executive branch, containing the State Depart-
ment, the intelligence agencies, and the military, is constantly aware of the nation's
security needs and the magnitude of external threats posed by a panoply of foreign
nations and organizations. On the other hand, while the courts possess expertise in
making the probable cause determination involved in surveillance of suspected
criminals, the courts are unschooled in diplomacy and military affairs, a mastery of
which would be essential to passing upon an executive branch request that a foreign
intelligence wiretap be authorized. Few, if any, district courts would be truly compe-
tent to judge the importance of particular information to the security of the United
States or the "probable cause" to demonstrate that the government in fact needs to
recover that information from one particular source.
Perhaps most crucially, the executive branch not only has superior expertise in the
[Vol. 35:97
Warrantless Physical Searches
on this reasoning, the appeals court upheld the district court's findings re-
garding both the warrantless electronic surveillance and the warrantless
physical searches.16 °
In a related case,16 1 Chagnon v. Bell, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the Attorney General
and other federal defendants enjoyed good faith immunity from claims for
damages brought by individuals who had been overheard in the course of the
Truong surveillances. As part of its analysis, the court indicated that
Zweibon did not represent a judicial holding that there is no foreign intelli-
gence exception to the warrant requirement.1 62 The court also observed:
"Just as the Attorney General could have found no authoritative judicial or
presidential statement proscribing warrantless wiretaps such as the Truong
surveillance, any search for definitive legislative guidance would have been
futile."'
163
area of foreign intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent
authority in foreign affairs. The President and his deputies are charged by the consti-
tution with the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States in times of war and
peace. Just as the separation of powers in Keith forced the executive to recognize a
judicial role when the President conducts domestic security surveillance, so the sepa-
ration of powers requires us to acknowledge the principal responsibility of the Presi-
dent for foreign affairs and concomitantly for foreign intelligence surveillance.
In sum, because of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical
experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should not require the exec-
utive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.
Id. at 913-14 (footnotes and citations omitted); but see Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and
the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976, 980-94 (1974); Developments in the Law, supra
note 29, at 1268-70. The recent Note briefly refers to the Truong opinion and describes the
criteria relied upon there to sustain the warrantless searches conducted in that investigation as
proof that prior judicial review is required. Note, supra note 11, at 624 n. 81. While the courts
ultimately determine whether these criteria have been satisfied, there is no indication in Truong
that the court contemplated any "prior" judicial determination tantamount to a warrant that
would dispense with the issue of inherent Executive authority. Rather, the courts have been
content to review Executive efforts to satisfy judicial criteria in this area after the fact. See,
e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d at 914-15; Butenko, 494 F.2d at 604-05; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 57.
160. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915-17 & n.8. The enactment of FISA provides the Executive
with a procedure to obtain prior judicial authorization for electronic surveillance in the United
States to gather foreign intelligence, and the Executive is no longer required to rely upon the
principles stated in Truong when conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes.
161. Chagnon v. Bell, 468 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1979), afid, 642 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981).
162. Chagnon, 642 F.2d at 1259.
163. Id. at 1260; see generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985) (most recent
Supreme Court discussion of the distinctions between domestic security and foreign intelli-
gence investigations, the degree of immunity available to the Attorney General in national
security-related matters, and the state of the law concerning these subjects in the early 1970s).
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3. The Relationship Between Physical Searches and Electronic
Surveillance
United States v. Truong is the chief case to have considered directly
whether the Executive must obtain a warrant to conduct a physical search
for foreign intelligence purposes. Most other cases that have upheld the na-
tional security exception have involved only electronic surveillance. Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court in Keith stated that "physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected ... ,""6 In Payton v. New York, 165 which held that the fourth
amendment prohibits police from warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a
home to make a routine felony arrest, the Supreme Court stated: "It is a
'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."'' 66 The Court
concluded its discussion by observing:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a vari-
ety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their
. . . houses . . . shall not be violated." That language unequivo-
cally establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core [of the
fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion." 67
Accordingly, an assessment of the relevant law indicates a paucity of judi-
cial discussion regarding warrantless physical searches for foreign intelli-
gence purposes and substantial emphasis by the courts concerning the
weight of the fourth amendment as it applies to physical searches generally.
Nonetheless, Executive authorization of warrantless physical searches for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information is squarely within
the national security exception to the warrant requirement, and is clearly
consistent with the fourth amendment principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court.
In the first place, courts examining this issue have made no distinction
164. 407 U.S. at 313; cf id. at 326-33 (Douglas, J., concurring); infra note 413.
165. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
166. Id. at 586 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 477-78 (1971));
see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
167. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
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between physical searches and electronic surveillance. In Humphrey, 168
Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., upheld two warrantless physical searches by ref-
erence to his earlier discussion of the propriety of the warrantless electronic
surveillance. 6 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
analyzed the validity of these physical searches in a similar manner and
thought so little of the possible distinction between the searches and elec-
tronic surveillance that it confined its entire discussion of the issue to a
footnote. 70
The searches in Truong involved personal property, i.e., packages, and
may be considered on that basis to have been less intrusive in character than
searches of residential property. Nevertheless, neither court limited its anal-
ysis or hinted at any distinction between searches of premises and other
types of searches. Nothing in either opinion suggests that the dispositive
factor was that the searches involved packages rather than premises.
What is most significant about the opinions of both courts is that neither
made a legal or policy distinction between the electronic surveillances and
the physical searches. The courts applied the same analysis of the warrant
clause to both forms of intelligence gathering and both were treated as
fourth amendment "searches." Both courts held that there is an exception
to the warrant clause for foreign intelligence gathering and that the permissi-
ble searches in these cases, whether physical or electronic, were conducted
under the authority of that exception. The Justice Department had made
the same argument before the District of Columbia Circuit during the earlier
prosecution of John Ehrlichman. I' 1
168. 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978); see infra note 413.
169. Judge Bryan held: "Prior to this search the FBI obtained authorization from the
President to open the envelope without a warrant. This brings into play the foreign intelli-
gence gathering exception to the warrant requirement discussed earlier." Id. at 62.
170. The entire discussion reads:
A letter and another package were searched without a warrant but with executive
authorization. Because both of those searches took place before [the focus of the
investigation became prosecutive], in accordance with our resolution of the issue of a
foreign intelligence warrant exception, we conclude that neither of these warrantless
searches violated the Fourth Amendment.
Truong, 629 F.2d at 917 n.8. The recent Note does not take account of the fact that both the
trial and appellate courts in Truong applied the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
clause to sustain both warrantless physical searches and electronic surveillance. Note, supra
note 11, at 624 n.81.
171. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Eh-
rlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977), quoted in WATER-
GATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 145 (1975). The recent Note rejects Judge
Leventhal's concurring opinion in Ehrlichman urging that constitutional protections should
not be "whittled away on abstract grounds of symmetry" and that the foreign intelligence
exception should not be made available for physical searches merely because it is available for
electronic surrveillance. See recent Note, supra note 11, at 627-28 (quoting Ehrlichman, 546
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The Zweibon plurality opinion includes a similar conclusion, albeit in the
context of general skepticism regarding any exception to the warrant re-
quirement for intelligence gathering. In a lengthy footnote,' 72 the plurality
noted that because the fourth amendment has its roots in the English experi-
ence with executive searches and seditious libel prosecutions, it was under-
standable that the Executive had not asserted a prerogative to search the
papers and effects of dissidents based on its own determination that they
threatened national security. Nonetheless, because Katz extended fourth
amendment strictures to nontrespassory electronic surveillance, "there was
no reason to allow an Executive exception to the warrant requirement in
nontrespassory searches and seizures but not in trespassory searches and
seizures."17 3
No rational distinction may be drawn between nontrespassory and
trespassory searches.' 7 4 More to the point, no reasonable distinction is pos-
sible between two different types of trespassory searches. A microphone sur-
veillance implemented by a trespassory entry to install the listening device is
as intrusive as a properly limited physical search of the same premises. Once
activated, the microphone will transmit all conversations within its range to
the listener, including those of third parties and those involving matters to-
tally unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.' 75
Similarly, a telephone surveillance, while ordinarily not requiring trespas-
sory installation, also will reveal to the listener a broad range of communica-
tions involving any person on either end of any conversation over the
instrument involved. Conversely, a properly controlled physical search for
the indicia of espionage, such as codebooks or cipher paper (known in intelli-
F.2d at 938). Other commentators and jurists think electronic surveillance is more intrusive
than physical searches and that the warrant requirement should focus on the governmental
purpose behind the investigation, not the techniques used to pursue that purpose. Id. at 628.
The recent Note urges that "principled interpretation of the Constitution requires 'abstract
grounds of symmetry': if the Constitution produces different results in different cases, the need
for coherence requires that tenable reasons so dictate." Id. Similarly, the Note states: "Over-
all, no principled distinction can limit the national security exception, if indeed it exists, to
electronic surveillance." Id. at 629. The authors agree with this analysis. However, the logi-
cal consequence of its application is not a total rejection of the national security exception, but
rather the recognition that the principles that have led the courts to identify a foreign intelli-
gence exception to the warrant requirement for electronic surveillance also require the conclu-
sion that warrantless physical searches conducted in furtherance of similar governmental
purposes are lawful.
172. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 618 n.67.
173. Id. at 619 n.67.
174. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; see also Torres, 751 F.2d at 884; supra note 171.
175. For a discussion of the even more intense intrusion that may result when the elec-
tronic surveillance is conducted through visual means, see supra cases and materials cited in
note 149.
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gence parlance as "tradecraft"), is much less likely to involve the acquisition
of information concerning innocent third parties or information not relevant
to a foreign intelligence investigation. It is clear, however, that a common
feature of all these forms of information gathering is that they intrude to the
core of the subject's protected zone of privacy.
In many ways, a physical search may be less intrusive than an electronic
surveillance. For instance, the actual duration of the intrusion is ordinarily
much shorter because a physical search does not continue for days, weeks, or
even months after the initial intrusion. The Truong electronic surveillance,
involving over two hundred days of microphone and telephone monitoring
of one defendant's apartment, is a good example of the temporal intrusion
that such activities may involve.176 In addition to the lengthy monitoring of
one defendant, television monitoring and videotaping in another defendant's
office was maintained for eighty-five days.' 77
The Truong court's conclusion that the electronic surveillance in that case
was properly within the scope of the foreign intelligence exception and was
reasonable is consistent with prior cases on warrantless foreign intelligence
gathering and with general case law on electronic surveillance, 78 even given
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the highly protected nature of residential
premises. Such a massive surveillance, however, demonstrates the degree of
intrusion this eavesdropping may entail. It is difficult to argue that elec-
tronic surveillance of all activities occurring within a residence, through a
transmitting device installed by trespass and activated continuously for over
seven months, may be characterized somehow as less intrusive, either in kind
or degree, than a properly limited physical search of the same premises.
What concerns the courts and commentators about physical searches is
the substantial history of their use to suppress political dissent, including the
infamous "writs of assistance" prior to the American Revolutionary War. 179
While there must be constant vigilance against the abuses that are possible
176. Judge Bryan concisely summarized the magnitude of this surveillance.
The intrusion in this case was massive. The interception on Hung's apartment
began on May 11, 1977, and ran continuously for two hundred and sixty-eight (268)
days .... [T]he government estimates the number of calls involving Humphrey in-
tercepted as approximately twenty (20) and the total number of calls intercepted as
in excess of 500. The microphone in Hung's apartment was installed May 27, 1977;
it too ran continuously and for a period of two hundred and fifty-five (255) days. It is
uncertain how many conversations of defendant Humphrey were monitored.
Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 59; accord Truong, 629 F.2d at 912.
177. Truong, 629 F.2d at 912 n.l; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 59.
178. See generally Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
179. See, e.g., Keith, 407 U.S. at 326-33 (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Ehr-
lichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 32-34 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
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through unfettered, abusive applications of Executive power, the limits pres-
ently imposed upon warrantless searches conducted under Executive author-
ization preclude the arbitrary and widespread application of that power for
improper purposes. These limits are described at length below.' 8°
4. Judicial Tests for Allowing Exceptions to the Warrant Clause
The principles that support the Executive's authorization of warrantless
physical searches are wholly consistent with the standards for determining
the reasonableness of warrantless activities that were enunciated in Keith. 181
The first measure is whether the citizenry's interests in privacy and free ex-
pression are better protected by a warrant requirement. The courts have
imposed substantial conditions upon the Executive's use of warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance and, by extension, physical searches. These conditions 8 2
include the following requirements: that the search be expressly authorized
by the President or his alter ego, the Attorney General; that the search be
clearly targeted against a foreign power or its agents; and that the primary
purpose of the search be to gather foreign intelligence information. 8 3
These requirements are far from chimerical and present effective limita-
tions on the Executive's ability to act without a warrant. The requirement
that there be a connection between the subject of the activity and an identifi-
able foreign power is particularly difficult to establish in many situations
since such a connection is usually clandestine. Nevertheless, any contem-
plated warrantless search will not be lawful unless such a connection is iden-
tified. This requirement alone insulates the vast majority of the American
populace from any possibility of a warrantless physical search by the Execu-
tive because only a tiny fraction could ever be found to be agents of a foreign
power as the courts have narrowly used that term. By using this singularly
narrow standard, the courts have substantially protected individual rights of
privacy and free expression, to the degree that imposing a warrant require-
ment for physical searches to gather foreign intelligence would add little or
nothing. 8 4
180. See infra text accompanying notes 219-326.
181. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 219-90.
183. See, e.g., Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 910; Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 594; Truong, 629 F.2d at
908.
184. The recent Note asserts that even if the courts "rubber stamp" warrant requests for
physical searches for intelligence purposes, the procedure itself will force the Executive to
articulate the basis for the search in language "convincing beyond the immediate circle of
those proposing to conduct the search." Note, supra note 11, at 620 n.44; see Note, supra note
159, at 988-92. If the courts were truly to "rubber stamp" such requests, little convincing
would be necessary. Further, the Attorney General is outside "the immediate circle" de-
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The second prong of the Keith test is whether a judicially imposed warrant
requirement would "unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to protect
itself .. . 185 Currently, the only formal mechanism the Executive may
use to acquire a judicial warrant to conduct a physical search is rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.186 That mechanism requires a va-
riety of actions that are wholly inconsistent with the context and purposes of
physical searches to gather foreign intelligence information. For example,
rule 41 (d) requires that the target of the search receive a copy of the warrant
and a receipt for and inventory of the property seized. 187 Rule 4 1(g) re-
quires the executing officer to return and file the warrant and the inventory
with the clerk of court. Rule 41(c)(1) requires the Executive to show "rea-
sonable cause" to justify serving the warrant during evening hours rather
than in daylight. 1
88
scribed, as are the numerous federal officials and government attorneys who scrutinize such
matters before they reach the Attorney General and the members and staff of the congressional
intelligence committees who receive subsequent briefings on these activities. Cf Testimony of
Mary C. Lawton, Counsel to the Attorney General for Intelligence Policy, before the House
Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 10-11 (June
8, 1983) (describing the level of review of proposed surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes).
185. Keith, 407 U.S. at 315. Clearly, the criteria for determining when an exception to the
warrant requirement exists revolve around whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the underlying governmental purpose and not whether the public interest justifies
the search. See recent Note, supra note 11, at 629-30. While foreign intelligence gathering is
acknowledged to be a legitimate and important purpose, it may be asserted that there will be
little danger of frustration in this area because the courts will tend to defer to the government
in national security matters. Id. at 632 n.129. In fact, the recent Note states that "frequent
judicial errors" will likely result in more government searches than would otherwise be reason-
able under the fourth amendment. Id. Even if this were true, and even if forecasting judicial
mismanagement were an appropriate element for consideration in legal or national security
policy making, relying on judicial fallibility would inspire little confidence in the efficacy of the
warrant requirement and demonstrate little added protection for the citizenry.
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
187. Rule 41(d) states:
The officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or
from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for
the property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the
property was taken. The return shall be made promptly and shall be accompanied by
a written inventory of any property taken. The inventory shall be made in the pres-
ence of the applicant for the warrant and the person from whose possession or prem-
ises the property was taken, if they are present, or in the presence of at least one
credible person other than the applicant for the warrant or the person from whose
possession or premises the property was taken, and shall be verified by the officer.
The federal magistrate shall upon request deliver a copy of the inventory to the per-
son from whom or from whose premises the property was taken and to the applicant
for the warrant.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
188. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
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These provisions stand in stark contrast to the requirements for secrecy
and stealth that are ordinarily inherent elements of any physical search for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence or counterintelligence informa-
tion. Compliance with requirements like those contained in rule 41 would
require the Executive to prepare and file warrant applications and inven-
tories that would provide foreign powers and their agents with extremely
valuable information concerning the extent and nature of the information,
sources, and methods that are the foundation of this nation's intelligence
activities. Because there are no judicial secrecy procedures for protecting
the warrant and the inventory, both would remain in the appropriate clerk's
office and be open to inspection by anyone who wished to do so. Although
the court may temporarily seal the warrant and inventory of the items
seized, these documents cannot be kept under seal permanently. i 9 This
short-term amelioration would rarely, if ever, satisfy the needs of the govern-
ment in foreign intelligence investigations where criminal action is a remote
and rare occurrence.
The requirements of rule 41 serve a valuable purpose in the context of
physical searches conducted for traditional law enforcement purposes. By
their very nature, however, they would defeat the purposes and frustrate the
objectives of such searches in the intelligence area. Further, the courts have
held that these requirements are ministerial and are not required by the war-
rant clause of the fourth amendment. 190 In particular, the Supreme Court
has never held that notice to the target of a search is invariably demanded by
the fourth amendment; indeed, it has never clearly articulated the circum-
stances, if any, when notice is constitutionally required. 1 ' A few courts1 92
have relied on Berger v. New York' 9 3 and indicated in dicta that the fourth
amendment may mandate notice to the target. Nevertheless, both Berger
and Katz state only that the necessity for notice is like other steps in the
search and seizure procedure and should be judged by a flexible "reasonable-
189. Cf In re An Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Interception
of Oral Communications and Videotape Surveillance, 513 F. Supp. 421 n.* (D. Mass. 1980)
(Keeton, J.) (noting that the order authorizing aural and visual electronic surveillance had
been impounded for nine months until the targets were indicted). At least one court has sug-
gested that a warrant could not be obtained for a wholly surreptitious search. See infra note
397 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 446 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Gross, 137 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (Weinfeld, J.); see also United States v. Harrigan,
557 F.2d 879, 883 (1st Cir. 1977).
191. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16; see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963).
192. United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and re-
manded for further consideration of other grounds, 430 U.S. 902, rev'd on other grounds, 556
F.2d 244 (1977); United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1972).
193. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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ness" test that examines whether notice would frustrate the purposes of the
search. 194
In Berger, the Supreme Court struck down New York's eavesdropping
statute because it was not procedurally adequate to protect fourth amend-
ment values. At the same time, the Court did not determine that a particu-
lar set of procedures is constitutionally required. In fact, the Court stressed
that the fourth amendment's standards of reasonableness "are not suscepti-
ble of Procrustean application." '9 5 Berger also states that the requirements
of the fourth amendment "are not inflexible, not obtusely unyielding to the
legitimate needs of law enforcement." '96
The Court did find the statute challenged in Berger defective, in part be-
cause it lacked a procedure to show "special facts" or "exigent circum-
stances" to justify the secrecy necessary for the electronic surveillance to
succeed.' 9 7 However, the Court did not hold that notice to the target of a
surveillance is absolutely required. Instead, it recognized that the presence
of exigent circumstances could obviate the need to notify the target.
Physical searches to gather foreign intelligence depend upon stealth. If
the targets of such searches discovered that the United States Government
had obtained significant information about their activities, those activities
would likely be altered, rendering the information useless. With few excep-
tions, the value of foreign intelligence depends wholly upon keeping the
targets from whom it was obtained, and others, ignorant of the fact that the
information is known to the United States. As such, a uniform notice re-
quirement in this context would be devastating.
Rule 41(b) also limits the issuance of a warrant to searches seeking evi-
dence or instrumentalities of a crime.' 98 This requirement usually would
preclude authorization of intelligence-related searches under rule 41 because
only in rare circumstances could the Executive make a good faith represen-
tation that it desired a warrant to obtain evidence of a crime. In most cases,
194. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16; Berger, 388 U.S. at 60.
195. 388 U.S. at 53 (quoting Ker, 374 U.S. at 33).
196. Berger, 388 U.S. at 63 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
197. Berger, 388 U.S. at 60; see generally Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48
(1974).
198. Rule 41(b) provides:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the
fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or
intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal
offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully
restrained.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
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the Executive intends to obtain foreign intelligence information that will fur-
ther a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence investigation. An interest in
criminal activity ordinarily is secondary, incidental, or absent entirely. Very
few targets of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence investigations are
ever prosecuted.' 99 In addition, given the nature of clandestine intelligence
activities, the Executive would rarely be able to describe the object of the
requested search in advance with sufficient particularity to satisfy the prob-
able cause requirement of rule 41. Thus, any generalized effort to use rule 41
for intelligence purposes would subvert the purposes of the rule.
The comparative lack of specificity required in foreign intelligence gather-
ing does not mean, however, that the Executive uses warrantless foreign in-
telligence searches either to conduct general searches or to engage in
speculative "fishing expeditions." The Truong experience demonstrates the
inherent difficulties of these cases. The United States Government knew that
a Vietnamese national had requested that certain packages be carried surrep-
titiously to Vietnamese officials abroad who were involved in sensitive nego-
tiations with the United States. Although the government could not
describe the contents of the packages, all the circumstances indicated that
classified, diplomatic information was being passed to the foreign officials.
Within this context, the government could not have satisfied the specificity
requirements of rule 41, and the resulting inability to obtain a warrant would
have frustrated the purpose of the searches. This would have left unremed-
ied a significant breach of the national security. The government proceeded
in this case not in an unrestrained fashion but in a manner consistent with
the specific judicial requirements for warrantless foreign intelligence
searches.
During investigations of criminal activity, the government may encounter
similar difficulties. The specificity requirement is one of the major protec-
tions of the fourth amendment. It wisely places an obstacle between the
people and their government that can be overcome only for good and suffi-
cient reason. Nevertheless, it is inadvisable to indiscriminately transfer all
the rules and procedures of criminal investigations to foreign intelligence
investigations when the latter differ significantly from the former in terms of
their foundation, scope, objectives, and consequences for the subject.2"
199. See, e.g., SENATE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, at 12-13. It should be remembered
that the intelligence-gathering techniques that are the subject of this discussion must meet the
relevant legal standards not only when directed against United States citizens but also when
targeted against foreign nationals in the United States who enjoy fourth amendment protec-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
200. The recent Note points to § 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333, including circumstances
where a warrant is required for law enforcement searches in the standard for Attorney General
approval of intelligence searches, as evidence of executive branch "confusion" regarding the
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The Keith decision recognized that even domestic security investigations
are dramatically different from investigations of "ordinary crime" and may
be handicapped by ordinary warrant requirements. 20 In addition, Congress
has recognized that a foreign counterintelligence investigation differs mark-
edly from an ordinary criminal investigation because the goal of counter-
intelligence is to stymie suspected espionage, with prosecution frequently a
secondary consideration.
20 2
Efforts to obtain foreign intelligence information, as opposed to counter-
intelligence, resemble criminal investigations even less. Such investigations,
sometimes referred to as "positive" intelligence collection, seek to develop
information about the policies and positions of foreign powers on a broad
scope of the warrant requirement. Note, supra note 11, at 634 n.139. The Note deduces that
the Executive's position on the constitutionality of warrantless intelligence searches is based on
the fact that the exclusionary rule is available only as a remedy for illegal law enforcement
searches. Id. With the development of constitutional tort actions for money damages, accord-
ing to the author, the absence of a remedy is no longer a basis for failing to obtain a warrant
for intelligence searches. Id. Unfortunately, this analysis overlooks the substantial case law
that supports the validity of warrantless intelligence searches, not because there is no remedy
for a violation of relevant legal principles, but because those principles lead to a constitutional
standard that is not violated by such searches. Far from indicating confusion, the Executive
Order provision illustrates the precision and care with which the Executive has proceeded to
ensure that the relevant judicial standards concerning expectations of privacy, developed
largely in a law enforcement context, are met. The Truong case illustrates that the courts have
little difficulty with these distinctions or the application of the exclusionary rule when the
standards appear to have been applied inappropriately. See Truong, 629 F.2d at 912-17;
Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 55-65.
201. The Court explained:
[D]omestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considera-
tions from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." The gathering of security intelli-
gence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types
of information. . . . Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is
on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's
preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domes-
tic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional
types of crime.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
202. The Senate FISA Report delineated these distinctions:
The criminal laws are enacted to establish standards for arrest and conviction; and
they supply guidance for investigations conducted to collect evidence for prosecu-
tion. Foreign counterintelligence investigations have different objectives. They suc-
ceed when the United States can insure that an intelligence network is not obtaining
vital information, that a suspected agent's future access to such information is con-
trolled effectively, and that security precautions are strengthened in areas of top pri-
ority for the foreign intelligence service. Prosecution is a useful deterrent, but only
where the advantages outweigh the sacrifice of other interests. Therefore, procedures
appropriate in regular criminal investigations need modification to fit the counter-
intelligence context.
SENATE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, at 12-13; see also infra note 413.
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range of issues, instead of trying to uncover the espionage activities of such
powers. As such, they are wide-ranging and relatively unfocused. At the
same time, however, positive intelligence collection rarely is targeted at spe-
cific individuals, as are most criminal and counterintelligence investigations,
nor does it ordinarily focus on activities that might conceivably violate
United States criminal law.
Thus, sound grounds exist for the conclusion that a judicially imposed
warrant requirement for national security-related physical searches would
frustrate the Executive's purposes. Given the limited added protection of
individuals that such a requirement would achieve, the balancing required
by Keith tips decisively against a warrant requirement in this area.
It has been argued that the test of Camara v. Municipal Court,203 rather
than Keith, should be applied to warrantless physical searches. 2° 4 This over-
looks the fact that the Supreme Court formulated the Keith test to analyze
warrantless government intelligence-gathering activities in 1972, five years
after the Camara decision. In Camara the Supreme Court majority stated:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a gen-
eral exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement,
the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of
search in question, but whether the authority to search should be
evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search.2 °5
Proponents of the Camara approach recast the holding as a three-part test:
the governmental purpose behind the search, the degree to which a warrant
requirement would tend to frustrate that purpose, and a balancing of the
importance of the governmental purpose "discounted by the degree to which
it remains unhampered by the warrant requirement, against the diminution
in individual rights implicit in the loss of effective pre-seizure judicial scru-
tiny."2 6 The justification for warrantless physical searches for foreign intel-
ligence purposes can withstand the application of this test as well.
The recognized legitimacy of the government's foreign intelligence pur-
pose and the extent to which a generalized warrant requirement would frus-
trate that purpose have been previously discussed. 2 7 As part of the basis for
anticipating possible frustration, the Justice Department is credited with the
203. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
204. See, e.g., Note, supra note 11, at 629-35.
205. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
206. See Note, supra note 11, at 630 (footnote omitted).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 21-32; supra notes 181-202 and accompanying
text.
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argument "that security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial eval-
uation."2 °8 Several judges who have considered the national security excep-
tion for foreign intelligence investigations have agreed with the government's
contentions in this regard.20 9
The government has indicated that the complexities of world affairs nor-
mally are not within the area of judicial expertise, and that proper evaluation
of the nation's foreign intelligence needs frequently requires a thorough un-
derstanding of these complexities. Complexity is only one reason to antici-
pate that legitimate governmental purposes may be frustrated by mandating
judicial involvement in this area. Ordinarily the judicial process is not
designed to provide the security measures necessary to protect the often
highly sensitive information that would be included in warrant applications
related to national security. For example, when the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court was established by FISA, no sufficiently secure facility
existed in the Washington, D.C. area for the court to conduct its required
tasks, and the Judiciary had no funds available to prepare such a facility.21 0
Foreign intelligence activities do not ordinarily involve investigation of
criminal matters and are subject to very different considerations than law
enforcement activities. Both of these factors increase the difficulties that
courts accustomed to dealing primarily with domestic matters would en-
counter. Finally, if the government's actions in this area were delayed be-
cause of inflexible judicial procedures, the consequences could be severe and
sometimes fatal. All of these factors represent substantial burdens on the
Judiciary. They explain why Keith and three courts of appeals, in Butenko,
Buck, and Truong, refused to intrude into this area, and a fourth, in
208. See Note, supra note 11, at 631. The recent Note dismisses this because it was rejected
in Keith. Id. However, Keith involved domestic, not foreign, threats to national security, and
the courts have recognized that the argument should not be rejected out of hand in other
contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 60-87.
209. Truong, 629 F.2d at 913-14; Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 704 (Wilkey, J., concurring and
dissenting). See supra note 159.
210. See HOUSE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, at pt. 1, 71-72; Testimony of Judge George
L. Hart, Jr., before the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice (June 9, 1983). The recent Note observes that the creation of the
FISA court "significantly drains" the security issue of its "vitality." Note, supra note 11, at
632-33 & nn. 133-34. On the contrary, the FISA court embodies special security features not
found elsewhere in the federal court system and was designed especially to cope with the secur-
ity issue. As is explained later in this article, however, the FISA court reviews only electronic
surveillance requests and has no jurisdiction to issue orders with respect to physical searches.
See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text. The recent Note's intimation that enactment of
FISA may indicate a congressional intent to preclude all warrantless activities by the President
runs counter to the legislative history of that Act. Id. at 629 n. 116. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 332-65.
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Zweibon, was unable to agree on a course of action.
FISA created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,2 ' 2 whose oper-
ations have demonstrated that a properly structured, specialized court can
achieve the degree of expertise and security necessary to consider these is-
sues. FISA itself demonstrates that a properly drawn statute can reconcile
judicial functions with the policy discretion that must continue to reside in
the executive branch.2" 3 At the same time, FISA does not represent a con-
gressionally imposed, judicially mandated warrant requirement on the Exec-
utive. Rather, FISA is a complex vehicle that provides a custom-tailored
warrant procedure for the exercise of Executive authority to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.2 14
The development of this statute involved years of discussion by Congress
and the Executive concerning the demands of the fourth amendment and the
requirements of effective foreign intelligence and international terrorism in-
vestigations. As a consequence, FISA represents a compromise between the
two political branches concerning how the government should exercise its
foreign relations and national defense powers within the broad contours of
judicially established fourth amendment principles.
The Judiciary agrees that it should not intrude too deeply into Executive
efforts to collect foreign intelligence. Judicially imposed warrant require-
ments for physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes would be irre-
sponsible because the Executive does not have even a marginally adequate
mechanism to obtain such warrants.21 5 Such a requirement would totally
frustrate the Executive's needs in this undeniably important area. Instead,
the courts have served their responsibilities well by carefully defining the
limitations on these warrantless activities.
Judicial determinations permitting selected warrantless activities have not
been established hastily, unreservedly, or indiscriminately. In Brown, the
trial court found certain portions of the electronic surveillance to be unlaw-
ful.2 '6 The government conceded the illegality of certain portions of the
211. See supra text accompanying notes 59-141.
212. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1982).
213. See HOUSE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, at pt. I, 70.
214. The recent Note observes that Congress' failure to provide the means by which to
obtain judicial warrants for other types of national security searches cannot alter the reach of
the fourth amendment. Note, supra note 11, at 633 n. 134. Of course, neither congressional
action nor inaction may alter a constitutional standard. Again, however, the issue is not
whether any constitutional requirements have been altered, but what the fourth amendment
requirements are in this area and whether there is a national security exception to the fourth
amendment warrant clause.
215. See supra notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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electronic surveillance in Butenko, but the courts upheld the validity of the
remainder.2 7 The Truong/Humphrey courts carefully analyzed the physical
searches and the extensive electronic surveillance that had been performed,
upholding the major portion but suppressing the remainder.2" 8
Whenever the Executive invokes the foreign intelligence exception to the
warrant clause, the courts insist on stringent limitations that nullify its use in
inappropriate circumstances. The courts also recognize, however, the prac-
tical imperatives that require continued recognition of the exception. In
short, the Judiciary has determined that the balance required by Camara
tips against a strict warrant requirement in this area and that the Executive's
use of physical searches to obtain foreign intelligence information, embodied
in section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333, is constitutional.
B. The Parameters of the Exception for Foreign Intelligence Gathering
1. Approval by the President or the Attorney General
Several factors must be present to bring a physical search within the judi-
cially recognized foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.
The courts have held that the lawful exercise of this intelligence-gathering
authority requires the express approval of the President, or if such authority
is properly delegated, by the Attorney General. 219 This requirement was
first enunciated by Justice Byron White in his brief concurrence in Katz.
220
Justice White stated: "We should not require the warrant procedure and the
magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal
officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national
security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.",
22
Similar high-level and centralized review is required by title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,222 where Congress
has required that warrant requests for electronic surveillance of criminal ac-
tivity must be approved by "[tihe Attorney General, or any Assistant Attor-
ney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. ... 223 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement very narrowly, rejecting the
217. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 142-63.
219. See, e.g., Brown, 484 F.2d at 426-27.
220. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 364; but see id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring). For further discussion of
Justice Douglas' opinion, see infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
222. 82 Stat. 211-25, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982) [hereinafter cited as title III].
223. Id. § 2516(1). Although an Assistant Attorney General is empowered to authorize an
application, the statute requires judicial approval of the FBI's interception of wire or oral
communication.
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Executive's argument that other designated officials also could approve these
warrant applications.22 4
The requirement that either the President or the Attorney General ap-
prove the exercise of the warrantless foreign intelligence-gathering authority
was discussed at length during the prosecution of John Ehrlichman and
others for the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr.
Louis Fielding.22 5 At the time of the break-in, Ellsberg was under indict-
ment for disclosing the Pentagon Papers, a classified history of America's
involvement in Vietnam, to various publications. Ehrlichman had directed
personnel employed by the Nixon White House to break into and search Dr.
Fielding's office for information that would be detrimental to Ellsberg.2 26
Both the burglars and Ehrlichman were indicted for conspiracy to injure Dr.
Fielding's enjoyment of his fourth amendment rights.22 7
In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the de-
fendants argued that the break-in fell within the exception to the warrant
requirement for "purely intelligence-gathering searches deemed necessary
for the conduct of foreign affairs."' 228 The trial court rejected this contention
and held that the Supreme Court's unwillingness in Keith to consider war-
rantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes did not indi-
cate "an intention to obviate the entire Fourth Amendment whenever the
President determines that an American citizen, personally innocent of
wrongdoing, has in his possession information that may touch upon foreign
policy concerns." '229 Ultimately, the district court found that President
Nixon had not actually given "any specific directive permitting national se-
curity break-ins, let alone this particular intrusion., 23" Accordingly, the dis-
trict court rejected the defendants' contention that the Fielding break-in was
224. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 523 (1974).
225. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974) (Gesell, J.), afld, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (Wilkey, J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
226. See generally Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 914-16; WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION
FORCE, REPORT 60-62 (1975); Statement of Information: Hearings before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary pursuant to H.R. Res. 803, A Resolution Authorizing and Directing the Comm.
on the Judiciary To Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representa-
tives To Exercise its Constitutional Power To Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the
United States ofAmerica, Book VII- White House Surveillance Activities and Campaign Activi-
ties, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-36, 591-1337 (1974). This group of Nixon White House employees
was popularly referred to as the "plumbers unit." See id. at 36. For a discussion of the Penta-
gon Papers and excerpts from them, see id. at 591.
227. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. at 31; see 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
228. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. at 33.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 34.
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a valid exercise of presidential authority. The defendants were later con-
victed in a jury trial.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, Ehrlichman reiterated his contention "that the search was
legal because [it was] undertaken pursuant to a delegable Presidential power
to authorize such a search in the field of foreign affairs. ... ,23 1 Although
echoing the district court's concern,2 32 the court of appeals concluded that
the issue of whether the President had authority to approve a search in such
circumstances need not be decided "one way or the other, and no inference
should be drawn from [the court's] failure to discuss it." 233 The court ruled
that, irrespective of that question, the lower court "was unquestionably cor-
rect. . . in its ruling that. . . the 'national security' exemption can only be
invoked if there has been a specific authorization by the President, or by the
Attorney General as his chief legal advisor, for the particular case."
234
This stringent approval requirement is based upon the "danger of leaving
delicate decisions of propriety and probable cause to those actually assigned
to ferret out 'national security' information ..... ,235 The court of appeals
explained that if the Judiciary was not scrutinizing foreign intelligence gath-
ering, then approval by the President, or his "alter ego for these matters, the
Attorney General," was "necessary to fix accountability and centralize re-
sponsibility for insuring the least intrusive surveillance necessary and
preventing zealous officials from misusing the President's prerogative. '236
In announcing this conclusion the court expressly relied on Justice White's
statements in Katz. 237 Finding no express authorization by the President to
conduct this break-in, the court rejected Ehrlichman's argument that it did
not violate the fourth amendment.2 3
A similar holding was reached by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in United States v. Kearney,23 9 where an FBI
agent was charged with unlawful wiretapping and mail opening. Kearney
sought discovery to establish that the targets of these activities posed a threat
to the national security, thereby justifying his use of warrantless intrusive
techniques. 2 ° Citing Ehrlichman, the district court denied the discovery
231. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 913.
232. Id. at 923-25.
233. Id. at 925.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 926.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 926-27 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (White, J., concurring)).
238. Id. at 927-28.
239. 436 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
240. Id. at 1112.
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request because Kearney was unable to show that either the President or the
Attorney General had authorized his activity.24 The court concluded that
"any less of a requirement would give any minor yet zealous official a free
hand to disregard the vital privacy interests which lie at the core of Fourth
Amendment protection simply by conjuring up the 'national security' and
'foreign influence' spectre.
' 242
President Franklin D. Roosevelt appears to have been the first President
to delegate authority to the Attorney General to approve warrantless wire-
tapping to gather foreign intelligence.243 Subsequent Presidents have made
similar delegations. 2 " President Carter, because of the limited nature of the
delegations then in effect under Executive Order 12,036, personally ap-
proved the warrantless physical searches in the Truong/Humphrey investi-
gation.245 Nevertheless, Attorney General Bell had authority to approve
electronic surveillance and did authorize the telephone and microphone sur-
veillances used in that investigation.246
Currently, section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333 delegates the full author-
ity of the President to the Attorney General to approve warrantless physical
searches to gather foreign intelligence, and requires and empowers the At-
torney General to review all uses of this technique.247 As such, the require-
ment for review by the Attorney General is satisfied under current executive
branch procedures.
2. The Target Is a Foreign Power, Its Agents or Collaborators
The Fielding break-in was part of an investigation into conduct ostensibly
involving the national security. Thus, it could be termed a "national secur-
ity" investigation in the broadest sense, as Keith and Katz used that term.24 8
The activity investigated, however, involved only the disclosure of classified
material to domestic publications. There was also no indication of the in-
volvement of a foreign power or its agents. Accordingly, the warrantless use
of intrusive techniques did not fall within the foreign intelligence exception
241. Id. at 1112-14.
242. Id. at 1113.
243. See Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Attorney General (May 21,
1940), reprinted in Barker, 514 F.2d at 246; CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note
29, at 279-81.
244. See Barker, 514 F.2d at 246-48; see generally CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT,
supra note 29, at 271-351.
245. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 62-63; see supra text accompanying notes 142-63; Exec.
Order No. 12,036, supra note 7, at §§ 2-201, 2-204.
246. Truong, 629 F.2d at 912; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 54; see Exec. Order No. 12,036,
supra note 7, at § 2-201(b).
247. See § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. at 212, supra note 1.
248. See, e.g., Keith, 407 U.S. at 321; Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
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and was inconsistent with the Keith holding that the Executive must obtain a
warrant for searches that are part of domestic security investigations.249
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court carefully explained that the Keith
holding did not reach "to activities of foreign powers or their agents." 250
Truong considered the activities left unaddressed by Keith and held that
warrantless searches for purposes of foreign intelligence collection are
proper "when the object of the search . . . is a foreign power, its agent or
collaborators.",25' Since neither Daniel Ellsberg nor his psychiatrist were
accused of having such a relationship with any foreign power, searches di-
rected against them could not have satisfied this requirement for a warrant-
less physical search.
Section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333 expressly requires that any warrant-
less physical search for foreign intelligence purposes be based upon a deter-
mination by the Attorney General "that there is probable cause to believe
that the [physical search] is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power." '252 Thus, only a foreign power, its agent, or a collaborator
may be the target of a warrantless physical search for foreign intelligence
purposes.
3. The Primary Purpose Test
The Third Circuit in Butenko held that a judge reviewing a warrantless
foreign intelligence surveillance must determine whether the "primary pur-
pose" of the search was in fact to secure foreign intelligence information and
whether "the accumulation of evidence of criminal activity was inciden-
tal. ' 253 The court also held that the government's electronic surveillance
did not require prior judicial authorization because the surveillance was
"conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intel-
ligence information. ,254
The defendants in Truong and Humphrey argued that the exception to the
warrant requirement applied only when the purpose of the investigation was
"solely" to gather foreign intelligence information and there was no intent to
249. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320-21; see supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
250. Keith, 407 U.S. at 308-09, 321-22; see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
251. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915; cf. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 613 n.42 (discussing limitations on
the Executive's assertion of an exception to the warrant requirement for investigations of activ-
ities that may "affect" the nation's relations with foreign powers); see also Note, Government
Monitoring of International Electronic Communications: National Security Agency Watch List
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 441-44 (1978).
252. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also infra note 413.
253. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 606.
254. Id. at 605 (quoting Butenko, 318 F. Supp. at 72).
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prosecute the subjects.25 5 The trial court in the case rejected this contention,
holding that reliance on the warrant exception was appropriate so long as
the "primary," rather than "sole," purpose of the investigation was to gather
foreign intelligence information.256  The Fourth Circuit affirmed,25 7
explaining:
We think that the district court adopted the proper test, because
once surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the
courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause de-
termination, and because, importantly, individual privacy interests
come to the fore and government foreign policy concerns recede
when the government is primarily attempting to form the basis for
a criminal prosecution.258
The two courts applied the same analysis to both the warrantless electronic
surveillance and physical searches performed by the government.259
Thus, the courts agreed that a warrantless physical search is clearly lawful
where the Executive's primary objective is to gather foreign intelligence in-
formation. This is exemplified by the searches of the packages sent to Paris
by David Truong. 26° Truong's conduct strongly suggested that he was en-
gaged in clandestine intelligence activities directed against the United States,
but the government did not know what information Truong had accumu-
lated. Opening the packages permitted the government to learn what
Truong was transmitting to the Vietnamese diplomats and allowed the
United States Government to assess and prevent potential damage from dis-
closure of this information.
The court of appeals recognized that some foreign intelligence investiga-
tions may uncover criminal activity. Even though espionage prosecutions
are rare, "there is always the possibility that the targets of the investigation
will be prosecuted for criminal violations. 2 6 Thus, although the activity
under investigation may violate a criminal statute, this fact alone does not
obviate the basis for the search-the government's need to obtain relevant
foreign intelligence. The Truong court was satisfied that a warrantless physi-
cal search is valid if the government's primary purpose is to collect foreign
intelligence rather than to prosecute the target, even if evidence of a crime is
also acquired and the subject is eventually prosecuted.
255. See Truong, 629 F.2d at 915-16.
256. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 57-59.
257. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915-16.
258. Id. at 915.
259. See Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 62-63; Truong, 629 F.2d at 917 n.8.
260. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text; see also infra note 413.
261. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915-16; see supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
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In Michigan v. Clifford,26 2 four Supreme Court Justices advocated use of
principles similar to Truong's primary purpose test to assess the validity of
warrantless entries by fire investigators.2 63 The Court unanimously agreed
that firefighters have the right "to make a forceful, unannounced, noncon-
sensual, warrantless entry into a burning building" and to remain there
"while they continue to investigate the cause of the fire." 2 ' A unanimous
Court also determined that once the cause and location of the fire are deter-
mined, the rest of the premises may be searched only "pursuant to a war-
rant, issued upon probable cause that a crime has been committed, and
specifically describing the places to be searched and the items to be
seized."2
65
The Court was divided, however, over what the fourth amendment re-
quires between these two extremes. Four Justices argued that a warrant was
not required for further inspections when the purpose was "to determine the
cause or origin of a fire.",2 6 6 They observed that warrantless inspections for
purposes other than to acquire evidence of a crime furthered the strong pub-
lic interest in preventing the rekindling and spreading of fires.267 Because
the post-fire inspection is contingent on the occurrence of a fire, an event
over which the inspector has no control,26 8 these Justices would not require
an administrative warrant, as is required for building code inspections.
2 69
Justice Stevens accepted such warrantless entries as reasonable, but only
when the fire inspectors "had either given the owner sufficient advance no-
tice to enable him or an agent to be present, or had made a reasonable effort
to do so."27' The remaining four Justices also focused on the purpose of the
search, but argued that an administrative warrant was required for searches
"to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire."
27 1
All the Justices agreed, however, that the fourth amendment does not re-
quire a warrant based upon probable cause that a crime has been committed
when the purpose of the search is other than to collect evidence of a crime.
The Justices also agreed that evidence uncovered during these warrantless
262. 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
263. Id. at 653-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., and
O'Connor, J.).
264. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 654-55.
268. Id. at 655.
269. See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
270. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 303 & n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 647 (opinion by Powell, J.).
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inspections is admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings.2 72
These positions are consistent with the assertion that the warrant clause
exception is applicable when the primary purpose of the search is to collect
foreign intelligence information, rather than to uncover and prosecute crimi-
nal activity. Nevertheless, the requirements for notice or the acquisition of
administrative warrants that were advocated by five of the Justices in Clif-
ford, although perhaps feasible in the context of post-fire inspections, are not
practical for foreign intelligence collection. As explained earlier, notice of a
search would inform the target, and the foreign power for which the target is
acting, of our government's state of knowledge and intentions, and thus frus-
trate or mitigate the search.2 73 An administrative warrant requirement in
the foreign intelligence context would raise the same concerns discussed in
regard to acquiring traditional search warrants.2 74
The Executive has argued that warrantless investigative activities should
be upheld where there is a legitimate foreign intelligence interest without
regard to the relative weight of that purpose or the coexistence of other fac-
tors.2 75 The difficulty of measuring and identifying when that purpose has
risen to the level of intensity required under a "sole," "primary," "substan-
tial," "preponderance," or some other qualitative standard hinders the use of
such a test. The courts apply the primary purpose test to an investigation
after it has been completed, and their task is aided by evidentiary hearings
and the full documentary record of the investigation. Unfortunately, it is
substantially more difficult for the Executive to apply these standards in the
midst of an investigation, when the "record" is not yet complete and there is
a substantial premium on speedy decisionmaking. Also, imposing a "pri-
mary purpose" test raises difficult practical issues such as whether and when
a "crossover" from foreign intelligence to law enforcement procedures be-
comes necessary and how the differing standards of proof may be reconciled
where much of the supporting information may remain highly classified.
Careful scrutiny of the purpose and motives of each investigation is essen-
tial. Equally important is the need to obtain as much information as possible
272. Id. at 647, 650, 654-56.
273. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 185-218 and accompanying text.
275. Cf Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Sup-
press, at 36-38, United States v. Hovsepian, No. CR 82-917-MRP (C.D. Cal. 1983) (arguing
that judicial review of a FISA "warrant" should not incorporate the primary purpose test); see
also Truong, 629 F.2d at 915. In United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 59, the Second Circuit
concluded that FISA requires foreign intelligence information to be "the primary objective" of
electronic surveillance conducted under that statute but that reviewing courts should not in-
quire beyond the executive branch certification of purpose unless there was a substantial pre-
liminary showing of material false statements to the FISA court. Id.
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so that the President or the Attorney General may make an informed judg-
ment on the purpose of each proposed search. Given the nature and circum-
stances of foreign intelligence activities, if any standard must be imposed to
ensure the legitimate use of this exception, then "primary" would appear to
be a much more realistic and reasonable test of the purpose of the search
than requiring the government to proceed with a warrantless search only if
foreign intelligence collection is the "sole" purpose of the activity.
4. The Effect of These Restrictions
The Truong court concluded its discussion of the foreign intelligence ex-
ception to the warrant clause with an excellent summary of the requirements
the Executive must meet to fall within the exception.
The exception applies only to foreign powers, their agents, and
their collaborators. Moreover, even these actors receive the pro-
tection of the warrant requirement if the government is primarily
attempting to put together a criminal prosecution. Thus, the exec-
utive can proceed without a warrant only if it is attempting primar-
ily to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign powers or their
assistants. We think that the unique role of the executive in for-
eign affairs and the separation of powers will not permit this court
to allow the executive less on the facts of this case, but we also are
convinced that the Fourth Amendment will not permit us to grant
the executive branch more.27 6
The Executive's conduct of warrantless physical searches is fully consis-
tent with these requirements.2 77 More importantly, these requirements pre-
vent the Executive's warrantless searches from becoming "general" searches
and, thus, ensure that this exercise of inherent Executive powers is consistent
with the fourth amendment. The practical effect of these restrictions is to
preclude application of this powerfully intrusive technique to all but a very
few members of the general population.2 78 Further, these stringent criteria
obviate the need for an independent magistrate's review of the Executive's
use of physical searches to gather foreign intelligence.27 9
Justice Douglas' concurrence in Katz280 objected to Justice White's con-
tention that the Court should not require prior judicial authorization of elec-
tronic surveillance involving national security if the President or the
Attorney General had approved the surveillances as reasonable.2 81 Justice
276. Truong, 629 F.2d at 916.
277. See infra text accompanying notes 309-26.
278. See infra text accompanying notes 248-52.
279. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
280. 389 U.S. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
281. Id. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring); see supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
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Douglas argued that the fourth amendment rights of spies and saboteurs are
not adequately protected "when the President and Attorney General assume
both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral
magistrate., 282
The Attorney General and the President may not be "disinterested" nor
"neutral" as those terms are traditionally used to describe judicial officers in
fourth amendment analysis.283 Nevertheless, the President and Attorney
General are insulated from the immediate demands of an investigation and
have a broader perspective of the law and the public interest than the intelli-
gence officers directly involved in foreign intelligence-gathering efforts.284
Further, in the years that have followed Justice Douglas' objection to the
recognition of any Executive authority in this area, the Judiciary has im-
posed restrictions that considerably limit the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the President lest they become caught up in the exigencies of the
moment.
Justice Douglas' opinion indicated that he was particularly concerned
about the Executive's use of warrantless techniques in criminal investiga-
tions. In addition to the Justice's reference to the President or Attorney
General acting as "adversary-and-prosecutor," he observed that the Execu-
tive "should vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security
and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws."' 285 Justice
Douglas also stressed that the fourth amendment made "no distinction...
between types of crimes," and he rejected improvisation even though "a par-
ticular crime appears particularly heinous. 2
8 6
The restrictions on the foreign intelligence exception are consistent with
these statements. In particular, there is no attempt to distinguish among
categories of crimes. Rather, these restrictions limit who may approve the
use of this technique, who may be the target, and, most importantly, when
the technique may be used. The Executive may acquire foreign intelligence
information but may not use warrantless techniques when conducting an
investigation for the purposes of prosecution. When the Executive directs
the government's substantial prosecutive powers against an individual, the
fourth amendment scrupulously protects that individual's rights by requir-
282. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring); see Developments in the Law, supra
note 29, at 1268-70.
283. E.g., Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-17; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
284. See, e.g., Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 926-28; see supra text accompanying notes 241-47.
Further, at least as to the Attorney General, it is now clear that a knowing failure to respect
the constitutional standards may result in personal liability for the approving official. Compare
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
285. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359-60 (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 360.
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ing advance judicial scrutiny of the government's justification and need for a
search.
Furthermore, the Executive may not easily evade these judicially estab-
lished requirements. A paramount concern is that the Executive will use
warrantless physical searches to develop evidence of criminal activity with-
out undergoing the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate. Such a search would
seek to prosecute the target, however, and once the Executive did prosecute,
all of its activities would be open to the piercing scrutiny of the court. In
Humphrey, the district court painstakingly examined the Executive's con-
duct by reviewing the record of each day of the investigation. The court
concluded that a portion of the Executive's warrantless activity had oc-
curred after the primary purpose of the investigation appeared to have be-
come prosecutorial.287 The evidence obtained after that date was
excluded.288 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the evidence.289
Thus, there is little incentive for the Executive to subvert the purposes of
the warrant exception by attempting to use it to develop evidence for a crim-
inal investigation. Such an effort is likely to fail miserably and actually may
endanger an entire prosecution. As for concern that the Executive will use
warrantless physical searches to harass or invade the privacy of the citizenry,
irrespective of criminal behavior, a money damages remedy for wrongful of-
ficial conduct is available and serves as a powerful deterrent to abuse of this
authority by government officials.29°
The Judiciary has erected substantial barriers around warrantless foreign
intelligence-gathering techniques, including physical searches. These effec-
tively prevent Executive abuse of the warrant clause exception. First, either
the President or the Attorney General must specifically approve a warrant-
less physical search, thereby curbing overzealous subordinates who may be
too close to the investigation. Second, the target of the search must demon-
strably be either a foreign power or an agent of or collaborator with a foreign
power, thereby protecting the vast majority of Americans from any applica-
tion of this technique. Finally, the purpose of the search must be to obtain
foreign intelligence information, thereby prohibiting evasions of the warrant
requirement when there is no foreign intelligence interest and the govern-
ment wishes only to harass or prosecute the target of an investigation. These
objective standards greatly limit the Executive's discretion to conduct
searches that are inconsistent with the judicially enunciated principles that
287. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 58-59.
288. Id. at 59.
289. Truong, 629 F.2d at 916.
290. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4798; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d at 1248.
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form the basis for an exception to the warrant clause. In systemic terms,
these requirements also greatly reduce the degree of additional protection
that would result from requiring prior judicial authorization of such a
search.
C. The Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment
Although the courts have recognized several exceptions to the warrant
clause,29 the fourth amendment also requires that all searches, whether con-
ducted with or without a warrant, be "reasonable."'2 92 Judge Irving
Goldberg emphasized this point in the context of foreign intelligence gather-
ing in his concurring opinion in Brown. 293 Although agreeing that the war-
rantless surveillance in that case was lawful,294 Judge Goldberg believed the
Judiciary to be responsible for ensuring that such activities are also
reasonable. 29
Judicial determinations of reasonableness depend upon all the circum-
stances of a particular case.296 This ad hoc approach depends to a great
extent on differences in factual situations that make generalizations difficult.
Nevertheless, Butenko, Humphrey, and Truong provide guidance on the fac-
tors that render warrantless foreign intelligence gathering reasonable.
Specifically, Butenko emphasized that the minimum requirement of rea-
sonableness is that "some form of probable cause for the search and seizure
must exist.",297 The court in that case acknowledged that the probable cause
standard could be modified when the government's interest in conducting
291. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 47 for a complete quotation of the fourth amendment.
293. 484 F.2d at 418, 427-28 (special concurrence by Goldberg, J.).
294. Id. at 427; see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
295. Judge Goldberg eloquently explained his view of the judicial role:
We must not trespass into the field of foreign intelligence and frustrate the execu-
tive in the pursuance of its obligations to conduct our foreign affairs. The Fourth
Amendment, however, is no less a part of our Constitution than Article II, and its
great protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy must remain inviolate.
The fact that we develop the law of national security wiretaps largely in camera can
never be allowed to lessen our zeal in the protection of fundamental rights. Indeed,
the very secrecy surrounding our decisions requires that we give the closest scrutiny
to executive assertions of national security interest.
Brown, 484 F.2d at 428. In Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1312, the court stated that warrantless
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes "must still be reasonable" and con-
cluded that FISA "fully comports with the Fourth Amendment."
296. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); see also Truong, 629 F.2d at 916.
297. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 604; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 534; cf Developments in the Law,
supra note 29, at 1262-68 (arguing that electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence
without meeting the probable cause standard was unreasonable, with the possible exception of
surveillance of "foreign government officials").
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the search is compelled by "something other than a reasonable belief of
criminal activity, especially when the scope of the intrusion is limited.
2 98
Finally, the court stressed that warrantless foreign intelligence gathering
must have the collection of foreign intelligence information as its primary
purpose to be reasonable.2 99 Thus, Butenko viewed the primary purpose test
as both a criterion for permitting warrantless electronic surveillance to
gather intelligence and as a factor in ensuring the reasonableness of that
activity.
Truong and Humphrey expanded and clarified the Butenko discussion of
reasonableness. The courts in these cases carefully assessed the "massive"
electronic surveillance that had been conducted by the government in its
investigations. 3" Both courts looked to the nature of the target, a suspected
participant in an espionage ring, and the propensity of such targets to use
"possible code language or oblique references." 3 ° The courts also examined
the measures that were applied to limit, i.e., "minimize," the scope and
breadth of the surveillance.3"2 These courts viewed the primary purpose test
only as a test of compliance with the exception to the warrant clause and not
as a test of reasonableness.3"3 The discussion of reasonableness instead fo-
cused on the status of the target and the standards that governed the acquisi-
tion and handling of the information acquired.
The Executive conducts physical searches to obtain foreign intelligence
information in accordance with these reasonableness requirements. 3°4 In
particular, section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333 forbids warrantless physi-
cal searches to collect foreign intelligence unless "the Attorney General has
determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the
[search] . .. is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power." 3 5 This modified standard of probable cause for foreign intelligence
gathering is the same test Congress chose when it enacted FISA to regulate
298. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 606 (footnote omitted).
299. Id.
300. Truong, 629 F.2d at 912; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 59; see supra text accompanying
notes 142-63.
301. Truong, 629 F.2d at 917; accord Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 60; cf United States v.
Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977) (discussing electronic surveillance under title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978)); infra note 413.
302. Truong, 629 F.2d at 916-17; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 59-60. The Supreme Court
also has stressed the need for minimization during electronic surveillance and certain kinds of
physical searches. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
303. See Truong, 629 F.2d at 915-16; Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. at 57-59; infra note 413.
304. For further discussion of the Executive's compliance with the requirements of the
reasonableness clause, see supra text accompanying notes 309-26.
305. See § 2.5, supra text accompanying note 3 (emphasis added); infra note 413.
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electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence pur-
poses.3 "6 In addition, the modified probable cause standard is consistent
with the Supreme Court's statements in Keith that the fourth amendment
would tolerate modified procedures that are more consistent with the needs
and objectives of intelligence investigations.3 °7 Furthermore, the FISA pro-
visions that embody these principles have been upheld by every court that
has considered them.30 8
IV. EXECUTIVE ADHERENCE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Parts III.B and III.C of this article describe the requirements that a physi-
cal search must meet in order to satisfy the standards of the warrant clause
exception for foreign intelligence gathering and the reasonableness require-
ment of the fourth amendment. Section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333
prescribes certain general principles that govern the Executive's warrantless
foreign intelligence-gathering activities. The Order also requires that tech-
niques such as nonconsenual physical searches may not be used except "in
accordance with procedures established by the head of the [intelligence]
agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General." 3 9
The appendix contains relevant provisions from the procedures governing
the Department of Defense (DOD), which were approved by then Attorney
General William French Smith on October 4, 1982.31° These provisions are
extracted from DOD Procedure 7, entitled "Physical Searches," and outline
the factors that executive branch officials must consider to ensure that a pro-
posed warrantless physical search to collect foreign intelligence is reasonable
and satisfies the criteria of the exception to the warrant clause. A brief re-
view of these factors, which are similar to those embodied in the relevant
procedures adopted by the other United States intelligence agencies pursuant
to Executive Order 12,333, indicates that the Executive is complying with
the judicially established principles governing warrantless physical searches
to collect foreign intelligence information.3 1'
306. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)-(b), 1805
(a)(3) (1982).
307. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23.
308. See Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72-74; Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1190; Falvey, 540 F. Supp.
at 1312; Kozibioukian, No. 15,837, slip op. at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. filed June 14, 1983).
309. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 1, at § 2.4.
310. Department of Defense Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components that Affect United States Persons, DOD Reg. 5240. 1-R (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as DOD Procedures].
311. See supra text accompanying notes 219-308. The recent Note protests that the protec-
tions of the warrant clause would be illusory if searches could be conducted "generally" with-
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The DOD procedure governs all DOD physical searches for foreign intel-
ligence purposes in the United States and all such physical searches of the
person or property of any "United States person" abroad.312 The procedure
permits DOD to conduct searches of those active duty military personnel
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, whether in the United
States or abroad."' DOD may not conduct any other physical searches for
foreign intelligence purposes in the United States, but must instead request
that the FBI conduct such other searches.314 Abroad, DOD may conduct
its own physical searches of United States persons and their property.315
However, all DOD requests for FBI searches in the United States and all
DOD requests for approval of searches directed against United States per-
sons abroad must be submitted to the Attorney General and must conform
to the same standards.3" 6 Among other things, such requests must specifi-
cally identify the person or describe the property to be searched.3"7 Thus, no
general area or "dragnet"-type searches may be authorized.
A key element to ensure compliance with the warrant clause exception
and establish the reasonableness of the search is the requirement for a show-
ing of probable cause to believe the target of the search is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power.3" 8 The DOD procedure requires that DOD
provide the Attorney General with the information necessary to make such a
finding. 319 Before the Attorney General may approve a warrantless physical
out a warrant when the necessary prerequisite conditions for a warrant are not present. Note,
supra note II, at 619 n.42. Apart from the erroneous presumption that the warrant clause is
all-encompassing, it is clear that use of the warrantless search authority must be limited by
development and application of proper standards. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying
text. The existing procedural structure ensures that searches to gather foreign intelligence are
not conducted when the "prerequisite conditions," such as probable cause and Attorney Gen-
eral approval, are not present, and that general or indiscriminate searches to gather such infor-
mation are not authorized. See infra note 413.
312. DOD Procedure 7, § A. "United States person" is a defined term and includes any
United States citizen or permanent resident alien, any groups substantially composed of such
persons, and all business entities incorporated in the United States and not directed or con-
trolled by a foreign government. DOD Procedures, app. A, "Definitions," § 25.
313. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at §§ C. La, C.2.a (referring to the Manual for
Courts Martial issued under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
314. Id. § C.l.b.
315. Id. § C.2.b.
316. Id. §§ C.l.a, C.l.b, C.2.a, C.2.b.
317. Id. § C.2.b(l).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 248-52, 291-308.
319. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at §§ C.l.a, C.lb, C.2.a, C.2.b(2). The elabora-
tion of the term "agent of a foreign power" in the DOD Procedures illustrates that this and
other relevant terms can be defined in a manner that precludes unreasonable exercise of the
warrant clause exception for foreign intelligence gathering. See infra notes 320-21, 413.
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search under this procedure, DOD must provide sufficient information to
support a finding of probable cause to believe that the subject of the search:
-is engaged, for or on behalf of a foreign power, in clandestine
intelligence activities, covert activities intended to affect political or
governmental processes, sabotage, international terrorism or prep-
aration for such activities, or is knowingly aiding, abetting, or con-
spiring with such a person; or
-is an officer or employee of a foreign power; or
-is unlawfully acting for or at the direction of a foreign power;
or
-is in contact or collaborating with intelligence or security of-
ficers of a foreign power for the purpose of providing them with
access to information that has been classified by the United States;
or
-is a corporation or entity directly or indirectly owned or con-
trolled by a foreign power.32 °
The character of the information that may be the object of a physical
search is also specified in the DOD procedure. DOD must provide the At-
torney General with statements of fact that support a finding that the search
is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information
that is "significant" and cannot be obtained by any less intrusive tech-
niques.321 This ensures that the search is necessary to satisfy significant gov-
320. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at § C.2.b(2). Several of the other terms used in
this section are also defined in the DOD Procedures. For example, "foreign power" is defined
to include any foreign government, foreign-based political party or faction, foreign military
force, foreign-based terrorist group, or any organization made up, in major part, of such enti-
ties. DOD Procedures, app. A, "Definitions," § 12; see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1982). "Interna-
tional Terrorist Activities" is defined to mean activities by or in support of terrorists that either
occur totally outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means
by which they are accomplished, the persons they are intended to coerce or intimidate, or the
location where the terrorists operate or seek asylum. DOD Procedures, app. A, § 16; see 50
U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982).
The DOD Procedures also specifically caution that merely because activities may benefit a
foreign power, an agency relationship is not established without evidence that the activities are
directed by or in concert with a foreign power. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at
§ C.2.b(2)(c). The reference in the DOD Procedures to classified information means informa-
tion properly classified under Exec. Order No. 12,356, because its disclosure would result in
damage to the national security. National Security Information, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,874,
§§ 1.1(a)(l)-(3) (April 6, 1982).
321. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at § C.2.b(3)-(4). As explained previously, the
intelligence agencies define the term "foreign intelligence information" more specifically than
have the courts. See supra note 4. In the DOD Procedures, "foreign intelligence" includes
information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organiza-
tions or persons and international terrorists. DOD Procedures, app. A, § 11; see Exec. Order
No. 12,333, supra note 1, at § 3.4(d). "Counterintelligence" includes information gathered to
protect against espionage or other forms of clandestine intelligence activity, sabotage, or assas-
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ernmental interests and has a legitimate foreign intelligence purpose that
brings it within the exception to the warrant clause. DOD also must de-
scribe the nature of the foreign intelligence information it expects to acquire,
state the intended scope of the search, and establish a factual basis for a
finding that the intrusiveness of the search will be limited to that necessary
to accomplish the intended purpose of the search.322 These requirements are
intended to focus the search as precisely as possible and to preclude any
"general searches" of the type that prompted adoption of the fourth amend-
ment warrant clause.323
Also integral to the DOD procedure are descriptions of how the intended
fruits of a physical search will be disseminated and the controls that will
govern the retention and dissemination of incidental information acquired
about United States persons during the search.3 24 Provisions of the other
DOD procedures may be drawn upon to provide general standards for the
collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning United
States persons that is acquired by DOD in the course of its intelligence activ-
ities.325 These procedural elements supply the minimization standards that
assist in making reasonable the use of warrantless physical searches for for-
eign intelligence purposes.
Finally, to ensure that serious consideration is devoted to these matters,
only a limited number of senior DOD officials, all outside the immediate
operational context, are authorized to transmit requests for approval of such
searches to the Attorney General.3 26
Thus, the Executive has imposed procedural requirements on the conduct
of warrantless physical searches that fully satisfy judicial requirements to
invoke the warrant clause exception for foreign intelligence gathering. The
searches are approved by the Attorney General, targeted exclusively against
foreign powers and their agents or collaborators, and conducted only to ac-
quire valuable foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. The
procedures also are consistent with the elements of reasonableness that have
been identified by the courts because the procedures require showings of
probable cause, necessity, specificity, narrow scope, limited intrusiveness,
sinations, when conducted on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, and interna-
tional terrorism. DOD Procedures, app. A, § 5; see Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 1, at
§ 3.4(a).
322. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at § C.2.b(5)-(6).
323. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
324. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at § C.2.b(7).
325. DOD Procedures 2-4.
326. These officials are the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense; Secretary and
Under Secretary of the Army, Navy, or Air Force; and the Directors of the National Security
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. DOD Procedure 7, supra note 310, at § C.2.c.
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minimization, and consideration by impartial officials removed from the ac-
tual investigation. Since these warrantless searches qualify under a specific
exception to the warrant clause and are executed in a clearly reasonable
manner, they satisfy the requirements of the Constitution elaborated by the
Judiciary and, accordingly, are lawful.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND WARRANTLESS PHYSICAL SEARCHES
FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
At this point, several principles should be clearly understood. First, the
President cannot exercise any authority, including the authority to approve
warrantless searches to collect foreign intelligence, in contravention of the
fundamental protections embodied in the Constitution. 2 7 The preceding
discussion demonstrates that the exercise of this authority in accordance
with existing standards and procedures is not incompatible, but in fact is
entirely consistent, with the constitutional principles the Judiciary has enun-
ciated. Second, Congress may not grant the President authority that is in-
consistent with the Constitution.32 8 Third, the President may act from
independent authority, so long as this action is consistent with the Constitu-
tion, and Congress has not otherwise expressed its will.32 9 Finally, presiden-
tial authority and action in areas not expressly committed by the
Constitution to the President alone may be shaped and regulated by congres-
sional enactments.33°
327. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 621; see supra notes
33-46 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819). This is not to
say, however, that all warrantless searches in the United States for foreign intelligence pur-
poses would be unconstitutional if authorized by legislation. See Note, supra note 11, at 635
n.144. FISA explicitly empowers the Attorney General to approve certain electronic surveil-
lance without seeking the approval of the FISA court, and the constitutionality of those provi-
sions has not been questioned. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1982); infra note 345.
329. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also infra
text accompanying notes 400-08.
330. Id. There may be some differences of opinion concerning the precise breadth of Con-
gress' power to regulate the actions of the President in certain areas. See Note, supra note 11,
at 636 n. 148. While Congress generally may regulate the exercise of Executive power, it does
not necessarily have the power to preclude Executive action altogether when to do so would
frustrate a legitimate governmental purpose or prevent the Executive from fulfilling its consti-
tutionally-assigned functions. See generally Rovine, Congressional-Executive Relations and
United States Foreign Policy, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 41, 52 (1980).
The language of Youngstown Sheet & Tube-"[presidential] constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter"-implies a residuum of executive au-
thority in certain areas even where Congress may have acted to limit presidential discretion.
See Note, supra note 11, at 636 n.146 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 637).
Thus, Congress would be within its constitutional powers if it enacted a statute requiring a
warrant for physical searches related to foreign intelligence gathering and provided a suitable
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Because Congress has not granted the President authority to conduct war-
rantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes, there is no basis
for deliberating whether such a grant is either consistent or inconsistent with
the Constitution. Rather, until Congress chooses to act at all in this area it
is clear that the President is constitutionally empowered to act in the best
interests of the nation's security. 3
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act-Congress' Intent
After years of debate,132 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
was enacted by the Ninety-Fifth Congress and signed into law by President
mechanism for acquiring such a warrant. Congress probably could not require a warrant,
however, without providing such a mechanism since the absence of a procedure to obtain a
warrant would effectively frustrate Executive action in this area. Nor could Congress enact
standards that are so restrictive they effectively preclude the President from acting at all, even
when the national interest clearly demands action. See generally supra notes 185-214 and
accompanying text.
In this regard, although the Executive supported the enactment of FISA and Congress as-
serted that FISA's enactment marked the end of the Executive's inherent authority to conduct
electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes, the Executive has
never conceded that its inherent authority does not survive the enactment of FISA. Such
authority might be relied upon should circumstances ever arise where, for example, the "crimi-
nal standard" that is part of FISA could preclude the acquisition of foreign intelligence infor-
mation that is clearly essential to the nation's security. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (1982).
Such a situation, where the national security is imperiled and no effective means are available
to secure prior court approval, may be tantamount to exigent circumstances. Accordingly,
surveillance might proceed on the basis of that exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement. Whatever the rationale, the Executive has not foreclosed the possibility that it
may be forced to act on its own authority outside the provisions of FISA or title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See infra note 334.
331. The recent Note explains that determining congressional intent is difficult, but asserts
that the "available evidence" indicates congressional hostility toward warrantless physical
searches. Note, supra note 11, at 637. However, no evidence is cited for this observation.
Further, the Note is unclear what relevance should be attached to even widespread congres-
sional hostility that is unaccompanied by legislative action. Contrary to the recent Note's
assertions, what the record shows regarding warrantless physical searches for foreign intelli-
gence purposes is intermittent expressions of concern by some members of Congress, profound
indifference overall, and clear indications that Congress is not yet prepared to enact legislation
reflecting those concerns. See infra notes 349-65 and accompanying text.
332. See The Senate Judiciary Comm., Report to Accompany S. 1566, S. REP. No. 604, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566
before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1977); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976: Hearings on S.
743, S. 3197 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1976); Electronic Surveillance Within the United States
for Foreign Intelligence Purposes. Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence
and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-5 (1976).
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Carter on October 25, 1978. 333 Ten years before, Congress had enacted title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, a statutory frame-
work requiring judicial warrants for electronic surveillance conducted for
law enforcement purposes.334 At the same time, Congress specifically dis-
claimed any intention to affect the authority claimed by a succession of Pres-
idents to use warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes. 335 Despite the subsequent introduction of many proposals that
would have addressed this area in one way or another, 3 6 it was not until the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 that Congress agreed to take
effective action to regulate the exercise of the asserted presidential authority
to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign
intelligence.3 37
333. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982); 14 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1853 (Oct. 27, 1978).
334. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
211, tit. III; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982).
335. Title III provided specifically that:
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such meas-
ures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in
this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any
wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise
of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise
used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (repealed 1978).
336. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977, S. 1566, H.R. 5632, H.R.
5704, H.R. 7308, H.R. 9745, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); National Security Surveillance Act of 1975,
S. 743, and Bill of Rights Procedures Act of 1975, S. 1888, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Free-
dom from Surveillance Act of 1974, S. 4062, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Surveillance Practice
and Procedures Act of 1973, S. 2820, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
337. The recent Note claims that the enactment of FISA allows for only one of three mutu-
ally exclusive references to be drawn regarding Congress' intentions toward warrantless physi-
cal searches for foreign intelligence purposes. First, FISA embodies implied approval of such
searches; second, FISA is irrelevant to the validity of such searches; or third, FISA indicates
general disapproval of such searches. Note, supra note 11, at 637-38. The Note concludes that
the last inference, congressional disapproval of such searches, not only is the most logical of
the three, but also is most compatible with the legislative history of FISA. Id. To the con-
trary, however, the substance and legislative history of FISA indicate a clear and knowing
choice on the part of Congress to treat only electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes
within the United States and to leave for another day the issues raised by other warrantless
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FISA is a very complex and difficult statute that reflects a multitude of
compromises between the Executive, the Congress, and the various interest
groups that influenced its development. The substantive provisions of FISA
describe the mechanism and the procedural requirements for obtaining ap-
proval from the Judiciary or the Attorney General to conduct various types
of electronic surveillance of various types of targets.33 The key to under-
standing FISA lies in its definitions.339
FISA regulates "electronic surveillance," which is defined to include the
interception of international communications to a target who is a United
States person in the United States, wiretapping in the United States, inter-
ception of the microwave portions of telephone communications in the
United States, and microphone, closed-circuit television, or other forms of
electronic monitoring of activities in the United States, for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence." Other important defined terms relating to
the scope of FISA include "foreign power," "agent of a foreign power,"
"foreign intelligence information," "United States person," "wire communi-
cation," and "contents. '341 The purpose of this discussion is not to provide
a thorough understanding of FISA but rather to show that this Act does not
extend to physical searches.
techniques, including most electronic surveillance abroad and physical searches both in and
outside the United States. As is clear from the discussion in this section, no inferences are
necessary to arrive at the unmistakable conclusion that FISA is purposefully irrelevant to
physical searches to collect foreign intelligence.
338. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802-1805 (1982).
339. See id. § 1801.
340. The statute defines "electronic surveillance" to mean:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents
are acquired by intentionally targetting the United States person, under circum-
stances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, with-
out the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are
located within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or
radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f(l)-(4) (1982).
341. FISA defines these terms in the following manner:
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The only searches that are explicitly referred to in FISA are trespassory
(a) "Foreign power" means-
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by
the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United
States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments
to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United
States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
(b) "Agent of a foreign power" means-
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as
a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelli-
gence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States,
when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate
that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such
person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or
knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on
behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that
are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in
activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(e) "Foreign intelligence information" means-
(i) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is neces-
sary to, the ability of the United States to protect against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a for-
eign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to,
and if concerning a United States person is necessary to-
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(i) "United States person" means a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully
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entries necessary to effectuate and maintain electronic surveillance author-
ized under FISA.34 2 The Act creates the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, composed of seven federal district court judges.34 3 This
court is specifically empowered to authorize such entries and to issue orders
requiring landlords and others to cooperate with the government in this re-
gard. 3" The provisions authorizing the Attorney General, rather than the
FISA court, to approve certain types of electronic surveillance do not ex-
pressly include similar authority.345 Nevertheless, the Justice Department
has concluded that such authority is implicit in the specific authority vested
in the Attorney General by the Act.346 Congress presumably must agree
with this conclusion because it has been made aware of this opinion and has
not registered disapproval or disagreement.347 No other provision of the Act
admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1 101 (a)(20) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act), an unincorporated association a substantial number of
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but
does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined
in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.
(1) "Wire communication" means any communication while it is being carried by a
wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as
a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications.
(n) "Contents", when used with respect to a communication, includes any informa-
tion concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence,
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982); see also supra text accompanying note 319.
342. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(8), 1805(b)(l)(D) (1982).
343. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1982). An appeals court of three federal circuit court judges is
also provided for appeals by the government of FISA court denials of its applications for
authority to conduct electronic surveillance. Id. § 1803(b). It has not yet been necessary for
the government to resort to such an appeal since the FISA court has not yet found it necessary
to reject a government application. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
344. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b)(2)(B)-(D) (1982).
345. The Attorney General may approve surveillance when it is targeted solely against
communications among or between foreign powers and there is "no substantial likelihood"
that any United States person will be a party to those communications. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B).
Congress based this authority on the conclusion that "foreign states and their official agents, to
the extent that they are not subject to our laws, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment."
HOUSE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, pt. I, at 69 n.34 (referencing a letter from John Harmon,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Chairman Boland, dated April 18,
1978). This conclusion and statutory authority run counter to the recent Note's assertion that
all warrantless searches are unconstitutional per se. See Note, supra note 11, at 635 n. 144.
346. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1978 (1980-81), S. REP. No. 280, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-8 (1981).
347. Id.
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explicitly or implicitly addresses physical searches.348
Congress has clearly and unequivocally stated its intention to have FISA
control only particular types of warrantless electronic surveillance for for-
eign intelligence purposes. The final report of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence concerning FISA,349 the most complete and au-
thoritative part of the Act's legislative history, includes many statements in-
dicating the sponsors of FISA were fully aware that its reach was limited.35 °
348. FISA expressly repealed the provision that had disclaimed any intention on the part
of Congress in 1968 to affect the President's authority to conduct electronic surveillance for
national security purposes. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978). For the
text of the repealed provision, see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) quoted supra note 335. The recent Note
cites S. 3617, a pre-FISA proposal that would have amended, rather than repealed, this provi-
sion of title III. The proposed amendment would have limited the disclaimer in title III so
that it only exempted the President's authority to acquire foreign intelligence by means other
than electronic surveillance as defined in the bill containing the amendment. Note, supra note
11, at 641. The recent Note also draws upon an explanation in a Senate Report that the intent
of this amendment was to ensure that all electronic surveillance important to the national
security would be encompassed in one way or another-either by the warrant procedure that
would have been created by the bill or by the President's remaining inherent authority to
conduct electronic surveillance of foreign powers. See id. at 641 n. 168. The recent Note
claims that because this amendment was not included in FISA as finally enacted, Congress
showed its intent to restrict any inherent power that might exist in areas other than electronic
surveillance. That is, the Note urges that by totally repealing the disclaimer of intent to affect
inherent authority, rather than by amending the disclaimer and preserving it for nonelectronic
techniques such as physical searches, Congress indicated its intent to limit inherent authority
involving both electronic and nonelectronic means of collection. Id. at 642.
This assertion is groundless. In the first place, other provisions of the proposed amendment
would have left the President with inherent authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveil-
lance of foreign powers. Thus, rejecting the proposal in favor of a total repeal of the title III
disclaimer comports with Congress' intent to preclude only further assertions of inherent Ex-
ecutive authority to conduct any warrantless electronic surveillance in the United States. Sec-
ondly, there is no affirmative indication in either the title III disclaimer, the proposed
amendment, or FISA's simple repeal of the title III disclaimer, of any congressional intent to
deal with any technique other than electronic surveillance.
349. HOUSE FISA REPORT, supra note 19; see also SENATE FISA REPORT, supra note 19;
FISA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19.
350. For example, the Report states:
The Committee has explored the feasibility of broadening this legislation to apply
overseas, but has concluded that certain problems and unique characteristics in-
volved in overseas surveillance preclude the simple extension of this bill to overseas
surveillances. This is not to say that overseas surveillance should not likewise be
subject to legislative authorization and restriction, but the problems and circum-
stances of overseas surveillance demand separate treatment, and this bill, dealing
with the area where most abuses have occurred, should not be delayed pending the
development of that separate legislation. The committee notes the administration's
commitment to the development of a separate bill governing overseas surveillance
and expects to work closely with the administration on that bill.
HOUSE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, pt. I, at 27-28. At another place, the Report explains:
[T]his bill does not afford protections to U.S. persons who are abroad, nor does it
regulate the acquisition of the contents of international communications of U.S. per-
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The complex provisions of FISA and the statements of intent embodied in
the legislative history clearly indicate Congress' recognition that the Act
would not reach the full range of warrantless electronic surveillance activi-
ties the Executive was conducting at that time. Given this limited objective
within the area of primary interest, i.e., electronic surveillance, one cannot
reasonably conclude that Congress intended by silence or indirection to al-
low FISA to have any effect in the distinctly separate area of physical
searches.35
However, even these clear and rational inferences need not be relied upon
as a measure of Congress' intent. The proponents of FISA not only knew
how to be explicit, they exercised that knowledge:
The committee does not intend the term "surveillance device" as
used in paragraph [1801(f)] (4) to include devices which are used
incidentally as part of a physical search, or the opening of mail, but
which do not constitute a device for monitoring. Lock picks, still
cameras, and similar devices can be used to acquire information, or
to assist in the acquisition of information, by means of physical
search. So-called chamfering devices can be used to open mail.
This bill does not bring these activities within its purview.
Although it may be desirable to develop legislative controls over
physical search techniques, the committee has concluded that these
sons who are in the United States, where the contents are acquired unintentionally.
The committee does not believe that this bill is the appropriate vehicle for addressing
this area. The standards and procedures for overseas surveillance may have to be
different than those provided in this bill for electronic surveillance within the United
States or targeted against U.S. persons who are in the United States.
Id. at 51; see also id. at 100.
351. The recent Note proclaims that Congress "surely" did not intend to require warrants
for electronic surveillance and, at the same time, entirely exempt other types of intrusive activi-
ties from the warrant requirement. Note, supra note 11, at 638. This statement is contradicted
by the subsequent recognition that FISA does not apply to electronic surveillance abroad or
nonelectronic surveillance, i.e., physical searches, in the United States and abroad. Id. at 640
n.165.
The recent Note also cites the Church and Pike Committee reports as support for its conclu-
sion that warrantless physical searches "fly in the face of clearly expressed congressional in-
tent." Note, supra note 11, at 639. No citations are provided to support this assertion,
however, aside from general statements from the reports to the effect that abuses had occurred
and controls were advisable. Id. The only specific references given are to the legislative his-
tory of FISA, which only deals with electronic surveillance, and S. 2284, an ill-fated attempt at
an omnibus intelligence charter. See Note, supra note 11, at 631; see infra notes 353-56 and
accompanying text. These sources support the conclusion that there has been sporadic expres-
sion of congressional support for legislative controls on warrantless physical searches. Never-
theless, they lend no credence to the claim that any existing congressional enactment is
intended to bar or regulate such searches.
The recent Note's reference to § 2236 of Chapter 18 of the United States Code is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 367-99.
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practices are sufficiently different from electronic surveillance so as
to require separate consideration by the Congress. The fact that
the bill does not cover physical searches for intelligence purposes
should not be viewed as congressional authorization for such activ-
ities. In any case, any requirements of the fourth amendment
would, of course, continue to apply to this type of activity.35 2
Subsequent events further demonstrate Congress' understanding of the
limitations inherent in FISA and its unwillingness to date to enact legislation
that would regulate warrantless physical searches. In early 1978, prior to
FISA's enactment, then Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, a leading
member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, introduced S. 2525,
an omnibus intelligence charter that would have authorized and regulated
the activities of United States Government intelligence entities.3 53 Among
the 263 pages of detailed legislative provisions were the entirety of FISA,
352. HOUSE FISA REPORT, supra note 19, pt. I, at 53 (footnote omitted). In view of this
acknowledgement that FISA was not intended to have any impact on warrantless physical
searches, it is surprising that the recent Note should claim that the legislative history supports
the conclusion that Congress meant to disapprove warrantless physical searches generally and
that there is evidence the framers of FISA, relying upon the Church Committee Report, in-
tended to require a warrant for physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. Note, supra
note 11, at 639 n.165.
Further, the recent Note misconstrues a portion of the FISA legislative history in attempt-
ing to demonstrate flaws in the Executive's position on these matters. It attributes to Attorney
General Edward Levi the statement that the fourth amendment protects only United States
citizens and has no application to foreign powers or their agents. Id. It then rebuts this posi-
tion by noting that even a United States citizen could be an agent of a foreign power and that
the courts have recognized fourth amendment protections for non-United States citizens in
certain circumstances. Id. However, Attorney General Levi's actual testimony was much
more artfully drawn and carefully considered than the Note allows:
[W]ho are "the people" to whom the Fourth Amendment refers? The Constitution
begins with the phrase, "We the people of the United States." That phrase has the
character of words of art, denoting the power from which the Constitution comes. It
does suggest a special concern for the American citizen and for those who share the
responsibilities of citizens. The Fourth Amendment guards the rights of "the peo-
ple" and it can be urged that it was not meant to apply to foreign nations, their
agents and collaborators. Its application may at least take account of the difference.
Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm.
on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 30 (1976) (prepared statement of Attorney General
Levi) (emphasis added). Thus, the Attorney General was not arguing that the fourth amend-
ment does not protect United States citizens who may be agents of a foreign power, nor was he
asserting that non-United States citizens have no fourth amendment protections at all. Rather,
General Levi was explaining that, as has been recognized in FISA, there is a sound legal basis
for providing different standards of protection under the fourth amendment for persons in
different circumstances.
353. See Hearings on the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, S.
2525, Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House
counterpart was H.R. 11,245.
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which had not yet been approved, and additional sections that would have
required approval by the FISA court of electronic surveillance of United
States persons abroad and physical searches for intelligence purposes in the
United States or directed against a United States person abroad.35 4
Subsequently, after two years of hearings and discussions with executive
branch representatives, Senator Huddleston introduced S. 2284, a revised,
more abbreviated version of an intelligence charter. 355 This 180-page bill
did not include the provisions of FISA, which had been enacted by that
point, but did contain provisions that would have extended the authority of
the FISA court to physical searches for intelligence purposes in the United
States and to physical searches and electronic surveillance for such purposes
directed at United States persons abroad.356 Ultimately, these provisions
were not enacted. Thus Congress, during and immediately after its consider-
ation of FISA, acknowledged by consideration and rejection of these provi-
sions that neither FISA nor any other statute establishes controls over
physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.
If further proof is needed, a look at subsequent executive branch efforts to
obtain FISA court approval of physical searches for intelligence purposes
should suffice. In late 1980, the Justice Department disclosed that Attorney
General Benjamin Civiletti had determined that requests for Attorney Gen-
eral approval of warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence pur-
poses should be brought to the FISA court for judicial review, even though
the Executive continued to assert that the Attorney General and the Presi-
dent retained independent authority to approve such searches.357 This re-
354. Id. at 934, 944-45, 973-1016.
355. See Hearings on the National Intelligence Act of 1980, S. 2284, Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The House counterpart was H.R. 6588.
356. Id. at 36-38, 45-47, 52-62, 158-70. The recent Note attributes statements that these
proposals did not go far enough to facilitate foreign intelligence collection to Attorney General
William French Smith's testimony on the National Intelligence Act of 1980. The Note also
states that Attorney General Smith suggested that FISA had contributed to the "Imperial
Judiciary" and proposed amending it to adopt a lower "essential to the national security"
standard for domestic or foreign searches. See Note, supra note 11, at 641 n. 165. These state-
ments would be surprising to Attorney General Smith, since the testimony in question oc-
curred before he became Attorney General and even before the election of President Reagan.
In fact, Attorney General Smith never testified in any capacity on the proposed intelligence
charter. The references are actually to the testimony of Jack Blake, who was at that time the
President of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.
357. See letter from Kenneth C. Bass, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Department of Jus-
tice, to Edward R. Boland, Chairman of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 27,
1980, reprinted in REPORT OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978,
H.R. REP. No. 1466, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-16 (1980). Note that attached to the letter is an
explanatory memorandum to FBI Director William H. Webster.
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sort to the FISA court, which would have been expected to have been well
received if Congress were intent on requiring warrants for these physical
searches, caused great consternation and some disagreement among the
members of the intelligence oversight committees of Congress. 5 8
Although the FISA court ultimately approved all three of the physical
searches submitted by the Justice Department, the court itself evidenced
concern over its authority to approve these searches and directed its clerk to
develop a legal memorandum on the subject for the court.35 9 That memo-
randum concluded that the court had no authority to approve activities that
did not fit within the definition of "electronic surveillance" as provided in
the statute.3 °
In the spring of 1981, following the transition to a new administration and
the confirmation of Attorney General William French Smith, the Justice De-
partment submitted a memorandum of law to the FISA court reversing the
position taken under the previous Attorney General and arguing that FISA
provided no basis for FISA court approval of physical searches for foreign
intelligence purposes.3 6 1 On June 11, 1981, then Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court Chief Judge George L. Hart, Jr., issued an opinion on behalf
of the court concluding that it had no authority over such matters.36 2 The
intelligence committees of both the House and Senate reported and did not
disagree with this development.36 3 Significantly, members of those commit-
tees have continued to point out that legislation to regulate warrantless phys-
ical searches continues to be on their agenda for future congressional
consideration.36 4
There appears to be no reasonable basis for asserting that Congress in-
358. Id. at 5, 25-26; SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 (1979-80), S.
REP. No. 1017, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, 11-19 (1980).
359. H.R. REP. No. 1466, supra note 357, at 17-24.
360. Id. See supra note 340.
361. See Memorandum of Law, In re Application of the United States for an Order Au-
thorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property (U.S.F.I.S.C.,
June 11, 1981), reprinted in SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 (1980-81),
S. REP. No. 280, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-16 (1981).
362. In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical
Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property (U.S.F.I.S.C., June 11, 1981), re-
printed in S. REP. No. 280, supra note 361, at 16-19; see also infra note 413.
363. See S. REP. No. 280, supra note 361, at 3-4; HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT, H.R. REP. No. 318, 97TH CONG., IST SESS. 4 (1981).
364. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 12, at 17-19; SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTEL-
LIGENCE, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEIL-
LANCE ACT OF 1978 (1981-82), S. REP. No. 691, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 11-13 (1982).
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tended to do anything other than defer consideration of warrantless physical
searches when it enacted FISA or that Congress is less than fully informed
of the existence, legal basis, and continued exercise of this authority by the
Executive. The Executive's position that its activities are lawful is based on
a series of judicial decisions recognizing the existence of inherent Executive
authority in the foreign intelligence area and on the authority implicit in the
absence of any effective or practical means for prior judicial review of physi-
cal searches for foreign intelligence purposes.
In these circumstances, it must be presumed that the Judiciary by its find-
ings, and the Congress by its enactment of FISA and lack of effective action
regarding physical searches, have accepted the basic constitutionality of the
Executive's activities. As has been explained recently by the Supreme Court:
Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possi-
ble action the President may find it necessary to take or every pos-
sible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, "especially . . . in the
areas of foreign policy and national security," imply "congres-
sional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive. On the con-
trary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of
the President's authority in a particular case which evinces legisla-
tive intent to accord the President broad discretion may be consid-
ered to "invite" "measures on independent presidential
responsibility." At least this is so where there is no contrary indi-
cation of legislative intent and when. . . there is a history of con-
gressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
President.365
365. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (citations omitted). The recent Note acknowl-
edges the argument that Congress' failure to bar warrantless searches constitutes acquiescence
in light of the history of these activities. Note, supra note 11, at 642-44. It asserts, however,
that this argument is faulty on the grounds that: (a) acquiescence before 1967 is of dubious
significance because the Judiciary had not considered electronic surveillance to be controlled
by the fourth amendment prior to the Katz decision that year; (b) any inference of acquies-
cence is negated by the "turmoil" that has attended the exception to the warrant clause for
foreign intelligence gathering; (c) the "timid and infrequent" use of this technique by the Presi-
dent; (d) the enactment of FISA; and (e) Congress' incomplete knowledge on this issue. Id. at
643-44.
On the contrary, there is probably no more robust record of congressional acquiescence, if
not apathy, than exists with regard to warrantless foreign intelligence gathering activities. The
1967 Katz decision, holding that the fourth amendment applies to electronic surveillance, has
no bearing on physical searches, which have never been viewed as outside the fourth amend-
ment, either before or after Katz. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66
(1928). Further, Congress recognized the existence of inherent executive authority prior to
1967 and subsequently expressed its intention not to deal with the issue when it enacted the
disclaimer in title III in 1968. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (repealed 1978). The "turmoil" that
has existed regarding the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause has drawn more
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B. Section 2236 of Title 18, United States Code
It has been argued that another statute, section 2236 of title 18, United
States Code, which makes it a crime to conduct a law enforcement search
without a warrant,3 66 indicates Congress' intent to bar warrantless physical
searches for foreign intelligence purposes and criminalizes such activities.367
Left unaddressed, however, is the question of why Congress continues to
express concern regarding this issue, in the context of FISA and other bills
such as the National Intelligence Charter,368 if section 2236 accomplished
this result.
Actually, the legislative history and judicial interpretations of section 2236
attention to its use, refined its parameters, and diminished any congressional claim of lack of
knowledge. Since the recent Note provides no basis either for the alleged "timid and infre-
quent" use of such searches, or for the earlier statement that techniques other than electronic
surveillance are "rarely" used, little can be done to assess the relevance of these claims to the
issue of Congress' awareness and acquiescence. Note, supra note 11, at 638. The enactment of
FISA, accompanied by explicit refusals to encompass physical searches, demonstrates that
Congress is aware of the Executive's activities and has deliberately refused to act. Finally, any
claim of less than full cognizance by Congress is belied by the many statements of interest and
concern that appear in the Church and Pike Committee reports, as well as the FISA legislative
history and the periodic reports on FISA implementation that have been issued by the intelli-
gence committees of both Houses since its enactment. Note, supra note 11, at 639-41. For
example:
FISA does not apply to physical search techniques that would require a warrant for
law enforcement purposes, but do not fit the FISA definition of electronic surveil-
lance. Such other intrusive techniques are not authorized by statute for intelligence
purposes, but may be used under procedures aproved by the Attorney General pursu-
ant to Executive Order No. 12,333.
FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-4.
366. Section 2236 states:
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United States or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of the United States,
searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such dwelling without a warrant
directing such search, or maliciously and without reasonable cause searches any
other building or property without a search warrant, shall be fined for a first offense
not more than $1,000; and, for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
This section shall not apply to any person-
(a) serving a warrant of arrest; or
(b) arresting or attempting to arrest a person committing or attempting to com-
mit an offense in his presence, or who has committed or is suspected on reasonable
grounds of having committed a felony; or
(c) making a search at the request or invitation or with the consent of the occu-
pant of the premises.
18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1982).
367. See Note, supra note 11, at 638-39.
368. None of these bills contained any reference whatsoever to § 2236, an interesting omis-
sion since more than one of them would have authorized searches that would have come
within the recent Note's interpretation of § 2236.
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clearly demonstrate that the statute does not regulate physical searches to
collect foreign intelligence information. This provision originally was en-
acted in 1921 as an amendment to the Volstead Act,3 69 the statute that initi-
ated America's ill-fated ban on consumption of alcoholic beverages. Section
2236 was motivated by reports of overly aggressive conduct by prohibition
enforcement agents. It was not included in the bill that was considered by
the committees reporting on other amendments to the prohibition laws,37
but was instead added during discussion on the Senate floor.3 71 The House
objected to the Senate language as too sweeping and offered a substitute.3 72
The Senate rejected the House version, and a third version was adopted by
the conference committee.
The clear intent of the provision was to provide a criminal penalty for
warrantless searches that the developing case law determined to be imper-
missible under the fourth amendment. The Conference Report indicates
that Congress did not intend to create a statutory limitation on searches that
was stricter than fourth amendment requirements.3 73 Instead, the congres-
sional intent closely resembles the intention of the disclaimer regarding pres-
idential conduct of electronic surveillance for national security purposes that
Congress included in title II.374 Unfortunately, the legislative history of
section 2236 does not specifically discuss whether or to what extent the sec-
tion was intended to apply to searches for foreign intelligence purposes, nor
does it discuss how such searches were regarded "under existing law" at the
time.
Nevertheless, the section's legislative history clearly indicates that Con-
gress' primary concern was to deter the significant number of warrantless
raids conducted by prohibition agents,3 75 who were routinely stopping and
searching pedestrians and automobiles without warrants.37 6 In addition,
369. See ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 222-24 (1921).
370. See H.R. REP. No. 224, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. REP. No. 201, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1921).
371. See 61 CONG. REC. 4644 (1921).
372. See H.R. REP. No. 344, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
373. The Conference Report explained:
As the amendment is redrafted it does not take from the officers any right to search
where under existing law such search right exists, and it does not confer upon them
any right to make any search where under existing law they have none. The question
of its constitutionality as granting any unlawful right of search is not involved. The
provision agreed to simply provides that a penalty may be imposed on any officer for
any search made maliciously and without reasonable cause.
H.R. REP. No. 361, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921).
374. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-511,
§ 201(c), 92 Stat. 1797 (1978)); see supra note 335.
375. See 61 CONG. REC. 4646, 4722-24 (1921).
376. Id. at 4724, 5566.
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Senators described with great indignation the warrantless search of an entire
block of homes3 77 and all the cars parked at a religious event. 378 Fatalities
had occurred when innocent citizens had resisted the raiding officers, who
frequently burst into homes without identifying themselves as federal
agents.379 Thus, the warrantless intrusions that were the object of this legis-
lation were the antithesis of searches to obtain foreign intelligence, whose
success depends on stealth, precision, and caution.38 °
Very little case law has been developed under section 2236. There are no
reported prosecutions under this section, although it is possible there have
been a few unreported cases, especially during the 1920's. Judicial commen-
tary on this section is so sparse that it can easily be summarized here. In
Baxter v. United States,381 the court held that the warrantless entry by
agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit into a house where whiskey was stored to
arrest a man under surveillance, and the subsequent warrantless search of
the house, "plainly violated § 2236. "382 The court concluded that the de-
fendant's motion to suppress evidence should have been granted and re-
versed his conviction.38 3  In United States v. Coffman,384 the court,
discussing a motion to suppress, noted that the earlier codified version of
section 2236 expressly excepted from its penalties, as does section 2236 itself,
searches by officers serving a warrant of arrest.3" 5
The case of Hughes v. Johnson,38 6 considered section 2236 in the context
of a civil action. The owners of a poultry market that provided hunters with
cold storage for game birds sought damages for the allegedly unlawful
search of the market by federal game wardens. They contended that "the
conduct of the wardens amounted to unlawful search and seizure and that
the violation of such constitutional rights, made criminal by law (18 U.S.C.
§ 2236), is not protected by immunity . ,3. 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that the wardens
needed a search warrant to inspect the plaintiffs' market and then concluded
that the complaint failed to state that the plaintiff protested the wardens'
377. Id. at 5567.
378. Id. at 5751.
379. Id. at 5748-49.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
381. 188 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1951).
382. Id. at 120.
383. Id.
384. 50 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
385. Id. at 825.
386. 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
387. Id. at 68.
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388
entry or otherwise made known their lack of permission for the entry.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the action,
however, and remanded with instructions to grant the plaintiffs leave to file
an amended complaint.389
The most significant judicial statements on section 2236 occurred in the
course of the prosecutions of G. Gordon Liddy, FBI Director L. Patrick
Gray, and FBI agents W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller. As part of his
defense against charges that he conspired to violate the fourth amendment
rights of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist by breaking into his office,390 Liddy
contended that he should have been charged under section 2236, a misde-
meanor provision, in lieu of felony charges under section 241 of title 18, or
that section 2236 should have been charged as a lesser included offense to a
charge under section 241.391 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the prosecutor had the authority to
proceed under the provision of his choice and that since the elements of
proof for a charge under section 241 differed from those for section 2236,
section 2236 could not be charged as a lesser included offense under section
241.392 The court stressed that section 2236 "requires proof that the defend-
ant was engaged in 'the enforcement of law,' and that he acted 'maliciously'
in unlawfully searching the office building, while Section 241 is silent on
both elements. ' ' 39 3 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the posi-
tion that section 2236 only applies to a physical search conducted in the
course of law enforcement activities.394
388. Id. at 69-70.
389. Id. at 70.
390. See United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see generally supra
notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
391. See Liddy, 542 F.2d at 81. Section 241 states:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of an-
other, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
392. Liddy, 542 F.2d at 82.
393. Id. (emphasis added).
394. Intelligence activities are included under the broad reference to "law enforcement" in
the Privacy Act for purposes of that statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1982); see Jabara v. Web-
ster, 691 F.2d 272, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1982); Moorefield v. United States Secret Service, 611 F.2d
1021, 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 909 (1980). Nevertheless, Congress and the courts
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In the Gray-Felt-Miller prosecution, W. Mark Felt and L. Patrick Gray
raised similar arguments as part of their defense to charges that they con-
spired to violate fourth amendment rights by ordering the surreptitious
search of the homes of families and friends of Weathermen fugitives.a9 5
United States District Judge William B. Bryant rejected the argument of
Felt and Gray, but did so on a ground different than that stated in Liddy.39 6
He concluded that section 2236 was not intended to govern "covert activity"
that required secrecy to succeed and for which no warrant could be
issued.39 7
Thus, although the available record of interpretations of section 2236 is
not extensive, the information that does exist supports the conclusion that
section 2236 is not an impediment to properly approved warrantless physical
searches for foreign intelligence purposes. Other interpretations may be pos-
sible based on the literal language of the statute, but the legislative history of
have acknowledged in other contexts that intelligence activities are not law enforcement activi-
ties. See, e.g., National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495, 498, 50 U.S.C.
§ 403(d)(3) (1982); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
395. See United States v. L. Patrick Gray III, W. Mark Felt, & Edward S. Miller, No. 78-
000179, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 17, 1978).
396. Id. at 5-7.
397. Judge Bryant's analysis is particularly germane to the issues here:
The most appealing argument of the defendants is that Section 2236 was enacted
precisely to immunize to some extent federal law enforcement officers who overstep
their legal authority in the pursuit of crime. They urge that the entries alleged in the
indictment are exactly the kind of overzealous police behavior Section 2236 was
meant to reach and immunize from prosecution as felonies.
The Court is not persuaded to this view. The statute speaks of the federal law
enforcement officer who "searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such
dwelling without a warrant directing such search .... " The surreptitious entries
alleged in the indictment do not appear to be the warrantless searches to which
§ 2236 speaks. The warrant procedure assumes that an individual will know when
and under what authority a government officer has the right to enter and search his
house, and exactly what he does while there. It is an open process in which the
individual whose home is searched is presented with a copy of the warrant. And
even if no one is on the premises at the time of the search a copy of the process and a
receipt for any property taken is left on the premises, Rule 41(d) F.R. Crim. P.,
usually tacked onto the door or in some other conspicuous place. If no seizure is in
fact made, the copy of the warrant indicates as much.
The type of search described in this indictment depends for its efficacy on secrecy.
It is most closely compared to wiretapping, which to be effective must be seizure of
conversations of a person who does not know he is being monitored. There is no
indication that Congress contemplated such covert activity in connection with Sec-
tion 2236. In fact, the words of Section 2236 appear not to apply to the conduct
alleged in this indictment since it speaks of a search conducted "without a warrant
directing such search." No warrant could be issued for a surreptitious search. Thus
it appears that the police conduct which the statute relegates to misdemeanor status
is not the same as alleged in the indictment.
Id. slip op. at 6-7.
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the section indicates that Congress was not attempting to exceed fourth
amendment requirements to create a narrower statutory requirement.
Rather, Congress was responding to flagrant violations of the Constitution
by prohibition agents. Thus, as a deterrent to violations of constitutional
rights, the section is an anachronism, enacted long before the Supreme Court
created far more potent deterrents to this type of abuse.39 8
Judge Bryant's statements, albeit delivered in a different context, support
the conclusion that section 2236 was designed to control the open flouting of
the requirement to obtain a search warrant and never was intended to pro-
hibit warrantless searches that are consistent with fourth amendment re-
quirements. In short, section 2236 is not a bar to warrantless physical
searches conducted under the inherent Executive authority to collect foreign
intelligence information that has been recognized as an exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement.3 99 Section 2236 does not affect the
conclusion that warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence pur-
poses are not barred under existing law.
C. The President's Powers v. Congressional Authority:
the "Zone of Twilight"
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"' the Supreme Court rejected
President Truman's assertion that as "the Nation's Chief Executive and the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States" he had the
inherent authority to seize and operate "most of the Nation's steel mills""'
to prevent the damage to national security that he foresaw resulting from the
mills ceasing to operate during the Korean War. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Robert Jackson presented a definitive discussion of the President's
inherent authority and its relationship to the authority of Congress.4 "2 Jus-
tice Jackson postulated three possibilities for this relationship: (1) the Presi-
dent's authority is at its maximum when he exercises it pursuant to
congressional authorization; (2) when the Congress has failed to express its
position, the President acts on his own authority, but there is a "zone of
twilight" where he and the Congress have concurrent authority; (3) when
the President acts incompatibly with Congress' wishes, his authority is at its
lowest ebb.40 3
398. E.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 233-309.
400. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
401. Id. at 582.
402. Id. at 634-55.
403. The Justice eloquently wrote:
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As discussed above,' the Executive's conduct of warrantless physical
searches does not conflict with either the expressed or implied will of the
Congress. As such, the Executive's authority is not within the third cate-
gory postulated by Justice Jackson. Similarly, Congress has not enacted a
statute to authorize and regulate presidential power to conduct physical
searches to gather foreign intelligence as it did in FISA with regard to elec-
tronic surveillance. Thus, Justice Jackson's first category also does not apply
in this area. Accordingly, these Executive activities fall within the second of
Justice Jackson's possibilities-the "zone of twilight." These actions are
based on the President's independent responsibilities as Commander in Chief
and to conduct the foreign relations of the nation. Congress may prove to
have concurrent authority in these areas; however, since Congress has not
attempted to exercise such authority, this congressional "inertia, indifference
or quiescence" has effectively "enabled," "invited," and, in fact, made neces-
sary, the Executive's actions.
Justice Jackson placed President Truman's seizure of the steel mills in the
third category," and harshly criticized this action. He had no patience
with the argument that this action constituted a legitimate exercise of the
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that
the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by
the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on in-
dependent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than
on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disa-
bling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at
once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Id. at 635-38 (citations omitted).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 327-99.
405. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 640.
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President's power as Commander in Chief' 6 and would not "indulge" the
use of this power "turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a
lawful economic struggle between industry and labor. ' '"" At the same time,
Justice Jackson did not intend to restrict the President's lawful role as Com-
mander in Chief. To the contrary, Justice Jackson would "indulge the wid-
est latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to command
the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside
world for the security of our society.""
This is the precise objective of the presidential Commander in Chief power
when it is exercised to authorize warrantless physical searches directed
against foreign powers, their agents or collaborators, to collect foreign intel-
ligence. Such efforts seek to determine the intentions of "the outside world"
in order to protect the security of this democracy. Congress has the consti-
tutional authority, if it wishes, to place reasonable statutory controls on the
use of this foreign intelligence-gathering technique. Until it does so, how-
ever, the Executive power remains in the "zone of twilight," where it de-
serves the widest latitude so long as it is directed outward and conducted
within the confines of judicial precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Constitution has been described as "an intentionally incomplete,
often deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of
political ideals and governmental practices." 9 As such, it does not lend
itself to rigid, unchanging interpretations. Fourth amendment jurisprudence
certainly illustrates this axiom. The relationship and meaning of the two
clauses of that amendment have evolved markedly as the nation and society
have changed. A particularly striking example is the United States Supreme
Court's gradual abandonment of "the ancient niceties of property law" as
advancing technology served to make electronic surveillance by the govern-
ment more effective, more intrusive, and less dependent upon actual physical
410penetrations.
In the past, intelligence activities almost never were discussed, and entire
agencies involved in intelligence collection were hidden behind the cloak of
secrecy.41' Perhaps inevitably as the years passed, this led to controversial
406. Id. at 641-46.
407. Id. at 645.
408. Id.
409. L. TRIBE, Preface to AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii (1978).
410. Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, with Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942),
and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
411. For example, there was a time when the acronym for NSA, the National Security
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and questionable practices. The exposure of these practices resulted in ef-
forts to pull back the veil and scrutinize both the practices and the collection
techniques themselves. Many intelligence-collection techniques were ex-
amined to ensure that their use was necessary and consistent with the princi-
ples this government was established to protect.412
This process included close scrutiny of physical searches for intelligence-
collection purposes. The past fifteen years have been marked by significant
discussions inside and outside the government regarding the efficacy and
constitutionality of this intelligence-gathering technique. Law enforcement
and intelligence agency employees alike have been made painfully aware of
the requirement to obtain a warrant before conducting most physical
searches. At the same time, however, it has become more apparent to the
courts that a traditional search warrant is at times a cumbersome, inappro-
priate vehicle for regulating some searches, including those conducted for
foreign intelligence purposes, and that equivalent protection may be ob-
tained by more appropriate means.
The principles of the fourth amendment have been served while accommo-
dating the shifting interests that develop in an increasingly complex social
structure interacting with an exceedingly dangerous world. While it is true
that the Executive is allowed to conduct warrantless searches when neces-
sary to collect foreign intelligence information, this authority is confined and
directed by legal standards in the same manner as are the many other types
of governmental searches that are conducted without warrants. Section 2.5
of Executive Order 12,333 and its underlying procedures embody the judi-
cial requirements that warrantless foreign intelligence searches must be
targeted against foreign powers or their agents and collaborators, be based
upon information sufficient to constitute probable cause, be approved by the
Attorney General, and be attended by a variety of other safeguards to ensure
the reasonableness of the search.
By its evolutionary processes, the Judiciary has identified the principles it
believes are crucial to preserving the purpose of the fourth amendment-to
protect the citizenry from the excesses of government. The Executive has
incorporated these principles into procedures that govern the conduct of
government officials in this regard. To this point, Congress has accepted the
structure created by the other two branches and has not exercised its prerog-
ative to enter the field.
Agency, established in 1952 by a classified presidential memorandum signed by Harry S. Tru-
man, was said to stand for "No Such Agency." See J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE, 1-2,
281-82 (1982).
412. See generally CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 29.
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Some argue that even greater protections could be obtained if all such
government action were subject to a prior judicial warrant requirement.
This may be true in an ideal sense, but the cost under current law and proce-
dure would be the almost complete frustration of an important and legiti-
mate governmental function. The framers of the Constitution clearly
intended that the government they were creating would intrude into the lives
of individuals as little as possible. They did not intend, however, that there
should be no such intrusions.
At its core, government exists to protect the individual rights that are
proclaimed in the Constitution. It is inevitable that the government's efforts
to protect and preserve the Constitution will at times impinge on the rights
the Constitution guarantees. Balance is the key, and the effort to balance
these principles continues in a variety of contexts. Foreign intelligence gath-
ering is simply one way the government attempts to discern the intentions
and capabilities of the rest of the world as they relate to the interests of this
nation. These efforts must always be consistent with constitutional princi-
ples, and core values cannot be sacrificed to the momentary anxieties of par-
ticular officials. However, binding the government too tightly in order to
ensure maximum protection of individual rights in today's dangerous world
may result in maximum danger to the continued existence of those rights on
both an individual and a more generalized basis.
This article has attempted to demonstrate that a reasonably balanced reg-
ulatory system now governs physical searches for foreign intelligence pur-
poses. The Executive has taken significant steps to prevent future
occurrences of past excesses, and the Judiciary has recognized that foreign
intelligence collection activities represent one of the several categories of
governmental functions in which a warrant is not always required.4"3 Both
branches are essentially in agreement, and Congress has acquiesced in the
result by its failure to enact legislation governing this activity. The current
embodiment of this balance, section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333, is a con-
stitutionally valid exercise of the Executive's authority.
413. As this article was being prepared for printing, Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., also the
author of Humphrey, upheld the legality of a warrantless physical search for foreign intelli-
gence purposes in United States v. Wu-Tai Chin, Crim. No. 85-236-A, Memorandum Opinion
and Order at 13-14 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 1986). This opinion reiterated the lack of FISA court
authority to approve physical searches and discussed the unique characteristics of such
searches. In addition, the definitions and standards of the Attorney General guidelines gov-
erning these searches were held to be sufficiently precise to withstand a due process challenge.
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APPENDIX
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD
INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT
AFFECT UNITED STATES
PERSONS41
4
FOREWORD
This DOD regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of
DOD intelligence components that affect United States persons. It imple-
ments DOD Directive 5240.1, and replaces the November 30, 1979 version
of DOD Regulation 5240.1-R. It is applicable to all DOD intelligence
components.
Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," stipulates
that certain activities of intelligence components that affect U.S. persons be
governed by procedures issued by the agency head and approved by the At-
torney General. Specifically, procedures 1 through 10, as well as Appendix
A, herein, require approval by the Attorney General. Procedures 11
through 15, while not requiring approval by the Attorney General, contain
further guidance to DOD Components in implementing Executive Order
12,333 as well as Executive Order 12,334, "President's Intelligence Over-
sight Board."
Accordingly, by this memorandum, these procedures are approved for use
within the Department of Defense. Heads of DOD components shall issue
such implementing instructions as may be necessary for the conduct of au-
thorized functions in a manner consistent with the procedures set forth
herein.
This regulation is effective immediately.
PROCEDURE 7. PHYSICAL SEARCHES
A. Applicability
This procedure applies to unconsented physical searches of any person or
property within the United States and to physical searches of the person or
property of a United States person outside the United States by DOD intelli-
gence components for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.
DOD intelligence components may provide assistance to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other law enforcement authorities in accordance with
Procedure 12.
414. See supra note 310.
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B Explanation of Undefined Terms
Physical search means any intrusion upon a person or a person's property
or possessions to obtain items of property or information. The term does not
include examination of areas that are in plain view and visible to the unaided
eye if no physical trespass is undertaken, and does not include examinations
of abandoned property left in a public place. The term also does not include
any intrusion authorized as necessary to accomplish lawful electronic sur-
veillance conducted pursuant to Parts 1 and 2 of Procedure 5.
C. Procedures
1. Unconsented physical searches within the United States
a. Searches of active duty military personnel for counterintelligence pur-
poses. The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments are au-
thorized to conduct unconsented physical searches in the United States for
counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of active duty mili-
tary personnel, when authorized by a military commander empowered to
approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes pursuant to rule
315(d) of the Manual for Courts Martial, Executive Order 12,198 (reference
(h)), based upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons are act-
ing as agents of foreign powers. For purposes of this section, the term
"agent of a foreign power" refers to an individual who meets the criteria set
forth in subparagraph C.2.b.(2), below.
b. Other unconsented physical searches. Except as permitted by section
A., above, DOD intelligence components may not conduct unconsented
physical searches of persons and property within the United States for for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. DOD intelligence compo-
nents may, however, request the FBI to conduct such searches. All such
requests, shall be in writing; shall contain the information required in sub-
paragraph C.2.b.(l) through (6), below; and be approved by an official desig-
nated in paragraph C.2.c., below. A copy of each such request shall be
furnished the General Counsel, DOD.
2. Unconsented physical searches outside the United States
a. Searches of active duty military personnel for counterintelligence pur-
poses. The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments may
conduct unconsented physical searches of the person or property of active
duty military personnel outside the United States for counterintelligence
purposes when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve
physical searches for law enforcement purposes pursuant to rule 315(d) of
the Manual for Courts Martial, Executive Order 12,198 (reference (h)),
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based upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons are acting as
agents of foreign powers. For purposes of this section, the term "agent of a
foreign power" refers to an individual who meets the criteria set forth in
subparagraph C.2.b.(2), below.
b. Other unconsented physical searches. DOD intelligence components
may conduct other unconsented physical searches for foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of United States
persons outside the United States only pursuant to the approval of the Attor-
ney General. Requests for such approval will be forwarded by a senior offi-
cial designated in paragraph C.2.c., below, to the Attorney General and shall
include:
(1) An identification of the person or description of the property to
be searched.
(2) A statement of facts supporting a finding that there is probable
cause to believe the subject of the search is:
(a) A person who, for or on behalf of a foreign power, is en-
gaged in clandestine intelligence activities (including covert activi-
ties intended to affect the political or governmental process),
sabotage, or international terrorist activities, activities in prepara-
tion for international terrorist activities, or who conspires with, or
knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such activities;
(b) A person who is an officer or employee of a foreign power;
(c) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction
of, a foreign power. The mere fact that a person's activities may
benefit or further the aims of a foreign power does not justify an
unconsented physical search without evidence that the person is
taking direction from, or acting in knowing concert with, the for-
eign power;
(d) A corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by a foreign power; or
(e) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an
intelligence or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of
providing access to information or material classified by the United
States to which such person has access.
(3) A statement of facts supporting a finding that the search is nec-
essary to obtain significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.
(4) A statement of facts supporting a finding that the significant
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence expected to be obtained
could not be obtained by less intrusive means.
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(5) A description of the significant foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence expected to be obtained from the search.
(6) A description of the extent of the search and a statement of
facts supporting a finding that the search will involve the least
amount of physical intrusion that will accomplish the objective
sought.
(7) A description of the expected dissemination of the product of
the search, including a description of the procedures that will govern
the retention and dissemination of information about United States
persons acquired incidental to the search.
c. Requests for approval of unconsented physical searches under para-
graph C.2.b. must be made by:
(1) The SeCretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense;
(2) The Secretary or the Under Secretary of a Military
Department;
(3) The Director, National Security Agency; or
(4) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
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